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What is the normative justification for workplace safety 
regulation? The prevailing account, rooted in economic theory, is 
that regulatory interventions in this field are justified only by 
spillover and informational market failures.1 This article challenges 
the prevailing account by contending that worker safety 
regulations are also justified when they are necessary to enforce the 
relational expectations of employees. If my contention is correct, 
then it follows that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the 
Act) is justified by anti-opportunism—preventing employers from 
engaging in opportunistic, self-interested behavior that runs 
contrary to the principles of the relational contract between 
employees and their employers.2 
Recognition of the Act’s anti-opportunism purpose sheds new 
light on questions about the regulation of inherently dangerous 
jobs. A recent case involving the tragic death of a SeaWorld orca 
whale trainer, Dawn Brancheau, illustrates the issue. In 2010, 
Brancheau was killed by an orca whale named Tilikum.3 Following 
the incident, SeaWorld significantly changed its orca whale shows4 
and was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) for a violation of the Act’s “general duty” 
clause.5 The general duty clause requires employers to provide 
 
 1. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23, 26–28 (1982) 
(describing the classic justifications for regulating in response to externalities (or spillovers) 
and in response to inadequate information); W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Safety at Any Price?, 
25 REG. 54, 54 (2002) (“Government action in the health and safety arena can be justified 
when there are shortcomings in risk information or textbook cases of externalities.”). 
 2. See Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the 
Need for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1024 n.20 (1981) (defining 
opportunism as “[s]elf-interest seeking contrary to the principles of the relation in which  
it occurs”). 
 3. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 4. Lori Weisberg, SeaWorld Settles Orca Trainer Safety Citations, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2016, 3:00 A.M.), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-seaworld-osha-20160106-
story.html (noting that SeaWorld “put an end to trainers cavorting in the water with the 
whales” after Brancheau’s death in 2010). SeaWorld has since announced that it is  
phasing out entirely its practice of keeping and breeding orca whales in captivity.  
Greg Allen, SeaWorld Agrees to End Captive Breeding of Killer Whales, NAT’L PUB. RADIO  
(Mar. 17, 2016, 5:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/17/ 
470720804/seaworld-agrees-to-end-captive-breeding-of-killer-whales. 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2014); SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 24 BNA OSHC 1303 (No. 
10-1705, 2012) (ALJ). The general duty citation was for “exposing animal trainers to struck-
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“employment and a place of employment which are free from 
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm to his employees[.]”6 OSHA proposed that 
SeaWorld abate the violation by either providing a physical barrier 
between trainers and whales or maintaining a minimum distance 
between them.7 In SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, a divided panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld 
the citation, including the proposed abatement: there would be no 
more SeaWorld trainers in the water with orca whales during 
shows.8 Then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh dissented.9 
Judge Kavanaugh believed OSHA had overstepped its bounds 
by regulating employment that is, by nature, inherently dangerous, 
just like many other sports or entertainment jobs. Judge Kavanaugh 
wondered how the abatement required in SeaWorld was any 
different than OSHA prohibiting tackling in the National Football 
League (NFL) or imposing speed limits in NASCAR races.10 
Grappling with this issue, Judge Kavanaugh questioned: 
 
by and drowning hazards” when working with the orcas. See id. In addition to legal 
proceedings, SeaWorld faced significant public pressure regarding its handling of orca 
whales in the wake of the popular documentary film Blackfish (CNN Films 2013). See Michal 
Addady, SeaWorld Will Stop Making Killer Whales Dance for You, FORTUNE (May 2, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/02/seaworld-orcas/. 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012). The elements of a general duty clause violation are: 
(1) an activity or condition in the employer’s workplace presented a hazard to an 
employee, (2) either the employer or the industry recognized the condition or 
activity as a hazard, (3) the hazard was likely to or actually caused death or serious 
physical harm, and (4) a feasible means to eliminate or materially reduce the 
hazard existed. 
SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 748 F.3d at 1207. 
 7. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 748 F.3d at 1204–05, 1211, 1215 (denying petition for 
review). The proposed abatement would specifically prohibit trainers from working with 
orcas “unless the trainers are protected through the use of physical barriers or through the 
use of decking systems [which can raise pool floors], oxygen supply systems or other 
engineering or administrative controls that provide the same or greater level of protection 
for the trainers.” SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 2012 WL 3019734 at *11. The citation was first 
upheld by an Administrative Law Judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 2012 WL 3019734 at *30. 
 8. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 748 F.3d at 1204–05, 1211, 1215 (finding the ordered 
abatement feasible and noting that SeaWorld had already implemented many of the 
abatement procedures voluntarily after Brancheau’s death, including the cessation of all 
“waterwork” by trainers during performances). 
 9. Id. at 1216-22 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 10. Both Judge Kavanaugh and counsel for SeaWorld, Eugene Scalia, relied on the 
NFL and NASCAR examples. Id. at 1220; Final Opening Brief for Petitioner SeaWorld of 
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When should we as a society paternalistically decide that the 
participants in these sports and entertainment activities must be 
protected from themselves—that the risk of significant physical 
injury is simply too great even for eager and willing participants? 
And most importantly for this case, who decides that the risk to 
participants is too high?11 
These are important normative questions about the appropriate 
boundaries of workplace safety regulation and OSHA’s 
administrative enforcement authority.12 Judge Kavanaugh’s 
questions can be answered only by carefully examining the 
theoretical justifications for OSHA regulation. Traditional 
economic justifications would only permit OSHA regulation where 
the participants (here, the trainers) suffer from a specified 
information deficiency severe enough to undermine the contention 
that they are truly “eager and willing” participants. Even then, 
adherents of efficiency analysis would prescribe only narrow 
information-forcing regulation.13 But if an additional purpose of the 
Act is to combat employer opportunism, then regulation would 
 
Florida, LLC at 2–3, SeaWorld, 748 F.3d 1202 (No. 12-1375); see also Natalie Rodriguez, 
SeaWorld Ruling May Embolden OSHA to Tackle New Sectors, LAW360 (Apr. 28, 2014, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/528544/seaworld-ruling-may-embolden-osha-to-tackle-
new-sectors; Gloria Gonzalez, OSHA Flexes Its Regulatory Muscle, BUS. INS. (Jan. 3, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160103/NEWS08/151239972/osha-flexes-
its-regulatory-muscle-under-guidance-of-assistant?tags=%7C329%7C304. 
 11. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 748 F.3d at 1217 (emphasis in original). Judge Kavanaugh 
concluded that the Department of Labor, applying occupational safety laws, was not the 
proper body to determine whether the risks posed by sports or entertainment jobs were 
unreasonable. Instead, he argued other institutions including Congress, state legislatures, 
state regulators, and state or federal courts applying tort law were in a better position to 
make those determinations. Id. at 1222. Judge Kavanaugh’s argument echoes a position first 
taken by former Chief Justice Rehnquist in Industrial Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 
U.S. 607, 671–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), and later revived by Professor Cass 
Sunstein, that the Act’s operative provisions on health standards amount to an 
unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative authority. Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA 
Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1410–11 (2008). 
 12. Questions about OSHA’s authority to regulate inherently dangerous jobs under 
the general duty clause were raised shortly after the Act became effective yet have never 
been satisfactorily answered. See, e.g., Richard S. Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 and the Law of Torts, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 612, 623 (1974) (identifying 
“professional athletics, police work, fire prevention, explosives manufacturing, and some 
kinds of scientific experimentation” as occupations of great social importance that “cannot 
be carried on without the presence of some such hazards”). 
 13. See Thomas A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory Mismatch in the Workplace: An 
Informational Approach to Workplace Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1009 (2004) 
(rejecting risk-prohibition regulation in workplace safety, in favor of information-forcing 
regulation that is narrowly crafted to respond to information failures). 
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also be prescribed where necessary to enforce the relational 
expectations of employees like the trainers at SeaWorld. A 
relational view would take a closer look at the details of the 
employment exchange and craft a regulatory response designed to 
eliminate employer opportunism. A close inspection of the factual 
record in SeaWorld, with a focus on the parties’ relational 
expectations, confirms that OSHA’s citation and abatement order 
were proper. 
As a society, we recognize that all work poses some degree of 
risk and that employees, like Brancheau, are generally free to take 
on risky work in exchange for consideration.14 But regulatory limits 
on this general freedom, including the imposition of OSHA 
standards, are justified when necessary to respond to identified 
market failures or prevent opportunistic behavior. Moreover, anti-
opportunism functions as a limiting principle. The anti-
opportunism purpose of OSHA can be used to identify meaningful 
distinctions between the SeaWorld employment exchange and the 
NFL and NASCAR hypotheticals that troubled Judge Kavanaugh. 
It could serve as the basis for the creation of an affirmative defense 
to avoid overbroad application of the general duty clause. The anti-
opportunism principle explains how we can at once conclude that 
the SeaWorld case was correctly decided, and also that the NFL 
should be permitted to continue employing professional tackle 
football players. 
This Article argues that the Act has an anti-opportunism 
purpose, justifying regulatory action designed to enforce the 
relational expectations of employees and employers.15 Part II sets 
 
 14. See id. at 1014 (“[S]ome degree of safety risk necessarily accompanies productive 
activity, and the only way to eliminate all risk would be to eliminate all productive 
activity.”); see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1129, 1168 (1986) (citing studies providing “evidence that workers demand and obtain 
considerable wage premiums for exposing themselves to workplace hazards”); Lambert, 
supra note 13, at 1022 n.69 (collecting empirical studies supporting the proposition that 
“employers must pay risk premiums for exposing their employees to perceived risks”). 
Aside from the empirical evidence on compensating wage differentials, the idea dates back 
to at least Adam Smith. See generally ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
 15. Many other scholars have previously noted the importance of the relational 
character of employment contracts, including the father of relational contract theory, Ian 
Macneil. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 877, 897 (2000) (“Relational contract law is so all-pervasive that one feels almost 
foolish in giving examples. A few examples from but one type of contractual relation, 
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the stage by outlining the ongoing search for the unifying 
normative purpose(s) of employment law in the United States. Part 
III draws on the core tenets of relational contract theory, as well as 
new scholarly insights on the quasi-fiduciary nature of the 
employment relationship, to posit another central purpose for 
employment law—anti-opportunism. Part IV then narrows the 
focus by applying an anti-opportunism principle to the subfield of 
workplace safety law. In doing so, Part IV develops a set of 
corollaries, all drawn from the central anti-opportunism purpose, 
that ought to guide the case-by-case application of OSHA 
regulations. Finally, Part V addresses Judge Kavanaugh’s questions 
by examining OSHA’s enforcement structure and applying the 
anti-opportunism principle to a close review of the factual record 
in SeaWorld. 
II. SEARCHING FOR THE PURPOSE(S) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Before considering the Act’s purposes, we must begin by 
considering the purpose of employment law generally.  
Individual employment law16 is a sprawling field, sometimes 
characterized as a mishmash, a jumble, a hotchpotch, or a grab bag 
of largely disconnected federal and state constitutional protections; 
federal, state, and local statutory protections; administrative 
regulations, and common law governing the employment 
 
employment, will do: workmen’s compensation, numerous anti-discrimination laws, social 
security taxation and benefits, ERISA, OSHA, other workplace regulations, wage and hours 
legislation. All of these are relational contract law.”); Robert C. Bird, Employment as a 
Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 215 (2005) (“Employment is a relational 
contract. . . . Yet, current law insufficiently acknowledges relational norms.”); see also 
Symposium, Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 681 (2005) 
(comments of Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman). 
 16. Employment law, or what I will sometimes refer to as individual employment law, 
should be distinguished from traditional labor law governing collective bargaining between 
employers and the bargaining representatives of groups of employees. Relational contract 
theorists such as Ian Macneil view traditional labor law as another example of relational 
contract law. See Macneil, supra note 15, at 897 (“All of these are relational contract law. . . . 
To which needs to be added where collective bargaining is in place, the NLRA, LMRA, and 
a wide range of law governing unions and other aspects of collective bargaining.”). My focus 
here is on workplace safety law applicable to individual employees, apart from any separate 
considerations that may arise in the context of collective bargaining. 
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relationship.17 This mishmash includes subjects such as the 
principle of employment at-will, express and implied contracts  
for employment, tort limitations on the at-will principle, speech, 
association, and privacy rights; trade secret and intellectual 
property rights; duties of loyalty, wage and hour protections; 
family and sick leave protections; antidiscrimination protections, 
employee benefit protections, health and safety protections;  
and more.18 
Despite its breadth, the American Law Institute (ALI) 
recognized employment law as a sufficiently cohesive field to 
warrant the ALI’s publication, in July 2015, of the Restatement of 
Employment Law.19 The Restatement project was controversial 
from the start,20 and much of the controversy centered on a lack of 
 
 17. See STEVEN WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (5th ed. 
2012) (noting that texts on employment law can run into a “grab-bag problem”); see also 
Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 159, 164 (2013) (one of the restatement reporters, writing “employment law focuses on the 
employment contract and a grab bag of other regulatory provisions”); Jonathan D. Canter, 
The Employment Arbitrator and the Pro Se Party, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 52, 53 (2002) (“a jumble of 
statutory and common law rights and remedies”); Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a 
Restatement of Employment Law, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 279 (2005) (“The law of 
employment in the United States is a hotchpotch of constitutional provisions, legislative 
dictates, administrative rules, and common law—of tort and contract—that varies widely 
from state to state.”); Brishen Rogers, What Does Social Equality Require of Employers? A 
Response to Professor Bagenstos, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 83, 83 (2014) (“apparent 
doctrinal mishmash”); Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method?: Torts and Other 
Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079, 1080 n.3 (2014) (noting that 
some would describe the Restatement of Employment Law as a “mishmash”); Michael J. 
Zimmer, The Restatement of Employment Law Is the Wrong Project, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
205, 206 (2009) (“[L]abor and employment law in this country is a mishmash.”). 
 18. See generally TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING 
AND ITS LIMITATIONS, at xi–xix (3d ed. 2015). See also WILLBORN, supra note 17, at vii–xxi. 
 19. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The ALI’s charter 
defines its own purpose as “to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its 
better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to 
encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.” See American Law Institute, 
Certificate of Incorporation, https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/10/62/106284da-ddfe-
4ff4-a698-0a47f268ee4c/certificate-of-incorporation.pdf (last visited October 13, 2019); see 
also Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 434 (2004). 
 20. The entire project of restating the field of employment law was called into question 
by several notable scholars, including several members of the Labor Law Group, an 
organization originally founded in 1947 that includes law professors specializing in labor 
and employment law. See Group History, LABOR LAW GROUP, http://laborlawgroup.org/ 
?page_id=8s (last visited October 13, 2019). The Labor Law Group submitted a petition in 
2007, signed by sixty-two professors of labor and employment law, urging that the project 
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consensus about the overarching purpose (or purposes) of 
employment law.21 Why should there exist a separate body of law 
that uniquely governs the employment relationship, rather than 
simply having general principles of contract and tort law govern 
the parties?22 What should be the purpose of this separate body of 
employment law? The ALI’s Restatement reporters did not answer 
these questions, nor did they ever set out to do so.23 But the 
extended controversy surrounding whether a Restatement of 
Employment Law should exist at all hints at the deeply uncertain 
 
be halted. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Conference on the American Law Institute’s Proposed 
Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 app. 2 at 32 (2009). 
 21. The late Michael Zimmer, a leading employment law scholar and member of the 
ALI, argued that the Restatement was premature, because the disorganized common law 
“black letter rules are fundamentally floating free of any basic theoretical grounding.” See 
Zimmer, supra note 17, at 206. He criticized the ALI for beginning the Restatement project 
without first conducting a principles project that would have as its goal the identification of 
possible “overarching purposes” of employment law. Id. (“I think [the ALI] should start with 
a project on the principles of labor and employment law. The goal of a principles project 
would be to answer two questions: First, what are, and what should be, the overarching 
purposes of constitutional, statutory and common law approaches to labor and employment 
law? Second, how can the law be developed in ways to best serve those purposes?”). Zimmer 
recognized that arriving at a consensus on these questions through a principles project was 
unlikely but saw potential value in identifying those principles supported by consensus and 
narrowing the “range of difference” on the principles lacking consensus. See id. 
 22. See Alan Hyde, Response to Working Group on Chapter 1 of the Proposed Restatement 
of Employment Law: On Purposeless Restatement, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 87, 87 (2009) 
(criticizing the ALI for not beginning its project with consideration of questions such as 
“What is employment law? Why does employment law exist as a distinct subject? What is 
the point of having distinct rules for relations of employment?”); Lea VanderVelde, The 
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law at Midpoint, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 359, 362 
(2012) (“[T]he Institute decision to go forward [with the Restatement project] was made 
without any sustained discussion within the Institute about two meta-issues critical to its 
endeavor. First, what is the purpose of employment law? Is it the protection of workers or 
the containment of tort damages? And, when those purposes are in tension, how should that 
tension be resolved? Second, . . . what is the purpose of a restatement of the common law, 
and how is that purpose served here?”); see also Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent 
Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary on the Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 413, 417-18 (2012) (comparing drafts of chapters two and eight of the 
Restatement and arguing that the Restatement is internally inconsistent regarding its 
“visions about the employment relationship and about employee mobility”). 
 23. Samuel Estreicher et al., Foreword: The Restatement of Employment Law Project, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 1245, 1247–48 (2015). The reporters took as their principle audience judges 
and practitioners, and they viewed the performance of their task as constrained in a way 
similar to the constraints on judges—discerning, understanding, and articulating what the 
law is on a given point, apart from their personal views about what the law ought to be. See 
id. at 1248. The reporters recognized that the law governing employment relationships is 
influenced by a range of public policies, that these policies will at times be in direct  
tension with each other, and that the policies are shaped by social values that change over 
time. See id. 
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footing of employment law and highlights the need for continued 
attention to these questions. 
Scholars have been struggling to identify the normative 
purposes of employment law since long before the Restatement 
project began,24 and that work continues.25 The theory that 
implicitly or explicitly undergirds the majority of academic 
literature and pedagogy in the field is economic efficiency.26 If 
economic efficiency is the purpose of employment law, then the 
role of law generally is to intervene only where there exists an 
identified failure of the unregulated labor market to produce 
socially efficient outcomes.27 As Samuel Bagenstos puts it: “In line 
 
 24. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 
976 (1984) (defending a strong employment at will rule on efficiency grounds); Charles Fried, 
Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law 
and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1019 (1984) (“We should consider afresh what goals 
[our employment law system] should seek to attain and what rights it must respect.”); 
Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 8, 12 (1993) (considering employment, and particularly career employment, as 
a type of relational contract); see also Simon Deakin, The Law and Economics of Employment 
Protection Legislation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 330, 333–38 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) 
(describing the early “first generation” of economics-based critiques of employment 
legislation, including Epstein, supra, as well as subsequent developments in the economic 
analysis of employment laws). 
 25. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. 
REV. 225, 229 (2013); Hyde, supra note 22, at 87; Rogers, supra note 17, at 83 (asking whether 
employment law, “[g]iven its decentralized origins,” can “even have a normative core?” and 
agreeing with Bagenstos that it can); Zimmer, supra note 17, at 206. 
 26. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTS: 
BRINGING WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY INTO FOCUS 47 (2009) (“[T]he efficiency 
objective is currently ascendant in the American workplace.”); Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 
229, 229 n.12 (“One approach, exemplified by the work of Stewart Schwab and Alan Hyde, 
argues that individual employment law is justified if, and to the extent that, it serves the goal 
of economic efficiency.”). As Professor Bagenstos notes, one of the leading employment law 
textbooks uses economic efficiency as its first organizing theme. See id. at 229, 229 n.13 
(referring to WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 17); see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 436–55 (8th ed. 2011) (applying economic analysis to various subtopics 
within individual employment law). 
 27. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 22, at 89 (noting that federal employment legislation “is 
typically adopted when market failures prevent atomized markets from reaching efficient 
results”); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting 
Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 35 (2001) (“[E]mployment laws increasingly will have to be 
justified as responding to market failure . . . . Such market failures include collective goods 
problems or asymmetric-information problems.”); see generally Christine Jolls, Law and the 
Labor Market, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 359, 360 (2006) (“Because of the way in which the 
market constrains the prospects for using employment law purely to effect transfers of 
resources, the economic analysis of employment law in this review gives primary emphasis 
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with [this economic efficiency] argument, employment law 
scholarship fairly drips with economic-efficiency analysis.”28 
Professor Simon Deakin details multiple generations of theoretical 
accounts of employment law based on increasingly sophisticated 
tools and understandings of economic analysis.29 The powerful 
influence of the economic efficiency theory is likewise reflected  
in a number of judicial opinions interpreting and applying  
the existing individual employment laws with reference to 
efficiency goals.30 
A second possibility is that the purpose of employment law is 
to counteract bargaining power disparities by protecting the 
weaker party (employee) against the stronger party (employer).31 
 
to market failures in the employer-employee relationship. In the presence of a market failure, 
legal intervention through employment law may both enhance efficiency and make 
employees better off.”). 
 28. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 229. 
 29. See Deakin, supra note 24, at 333–38. Deakin highlights the insights that have been 
incorporated into later iterations of economic analysis of employment laws. These include, 
among other things, concepts of transaction costs, information asymmetries, and 
externalities that can undermine assumptions of a perfectly competitive labor market. See id. 
at 334–35. An even more recent wave of analysis, termed “a systemic-evolutionary” 
approach, views employment laws as “endogenous” to labor markets. That is, governmental 
interventions “often do no more than crystallize social norms or conventions that first 
emerge at the level of the market, in the form of behavioural patterns or routines, and that 
then go on to acquire greater formality in contractual agreements and legislative texts.” Id. 
at 336. 
 30. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 445–48 (Del. 
1996) (disapproving punitive damages for an employer’s breach of employment contract, 
citing efficient breach theory and the market forces applicable to employers); see also 
Gaglidari v. Denny’s Rests., Inc., 815 P.2d 1362, 1377 (Wash. 1991) (Utter, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (contending that emotional distress damages should be available 
against a breaching employer as a means of discouraging economically inefficient breaches); 
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988) (applying economic analysis to 
reject an employee’s tort claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing); Reddy v. Cmty. 
Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 913 (W. Va. 1982) (“Economic analysis compels the 
conclusion that restrictive covenants should be upheld where the employee has undergone 
certain types of training. Restrictive covenant protection is necessary, for example, to 
encourage efficient and extensive investment in ‘human capital.’”). 
 31. See Ian Ayres & Stewart Schwab, The Employment Contract, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
71, 74–75 (1999) (noting that non-economists view unequal bargaining power as “the basic 
argument for legal intervention in employment markets[,]” and criticizing bargaining power 
disparity as a rationale for employment law intervention); Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 230 
(“The other approach argues that the government should regulate the employment 
relationship to rectify imbalances of bargaining power between employers and 
employees.”); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 10 (describing the comments of Matthew Finkin 
at a conference of the Labor Law Group, who noted that “protecting employees from 
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In this account, existing individual employment law interventions 
are designed to protect employees from unfair outcomes resulting 
from the employer’s superior financial position and the employee’s 
financial dependence on a regular income stream.32 As a guiding 
normative justification for employment law, the bargaining power 
theory has received less support than the economic efficiency 
theory.33 Economics scholars are generally critical of this theory of 
employment law because a neoclassical economic analysis would 
not consider bargaining power disparities to constitute a systemic 
“market failure” justifying legal intervention.34 
Legal scholars have recently hit upon a third category of 
possible normative justifications for employment law: addressing 
concerns about persistent social or status inequality.35 In this view, 
the purpose of individual employment law is to promote social 
equality by intervening where necessary to eliminate or mitigate 
“not merely those practices that entrench caste-based deprivations 
 
exploitation because of inequity in bargaining power was indeed a guiding principle of 
employment law in many European countries.”); Cynthia Estlund, Between Rights and 
Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment 
Law, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 379, 384–85 (2006) (“Skepticism about the bargaining power of 
employees has contributed to courts’ willingness to intervene in the employment contract to 
redress abuses that offend public policy[.]”); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal 
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (illustrating the weaknesses of bargaining power 
disparity as a justification for law’s imposition of mandatory terms). 
 32. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 14, 30, 150 (describing the need to balance 
bargaining power disparities as one important component of the authors’ pluralist account 
of the purpose of employment law, discussed further below). 
 33. See Ayres & Schwab, supra note 31, at 77 (“It’s not unequal bargaining power. 
That’s the argument that economists think is just not a coherent or logical explanation for 
why the preferences of workers won’t be honored. It’s not an example of market failure. 
Other examples of market failure may explain or justify intervention in the name of 
safety. . . . But unequal bargaining power is not the explanation for what went wrong.”); 
Kennedy, supra note 31. As Aditi Bagchi notes, bargaining power disparities are not unique 
to employment contracts and the existence of a bargaining power disparity alone “tells us 
little about the fairness of the transaction, let alone the need for legal treatment favorable to 
the weaker party.” Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 579, 585 (2009). Bagchi contends that recognizing bargaining power disparity does 
not sufficiently capture the full extent of inequality between employees and employers, see 
id. at 589, and urges a status-based approach to employment law that would justify legal 
interventions to mitigate status inequalities. See id. at 582–83, 609–14, 628. 
 34. See Ayres & Schwab, supra note 31, at 74–77. 
 35. See Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 228; Bagchi, supra note 33, at 582–83. 
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but also those practices that would tend to undermine any worker’s 
status as an equal to her employer, boss, or supervisor.”36 
A fourth view, pluralism, appeals to those who question 
whether there is or should be any single unifying purpose driving 
all statutory and doctrinal facets of employment law. Stephen 
Befort and John Budd advance this type of pluralist theory in 
Invisible Hands, Invisible Objects.37 Befort and Budd argue: 
Our proposals for principled reform start with the pluralist model 
of the employment relationship. We see employees as more than 
simply commodities—employees are human beings with 
economic and psychological needs, as well as with citizenship 
rights in a democratic society. We see markets as important, but 
as falling short of the textbook economics model of perfect 
competition. . . . And we see the employment relationship as 
characterized by a plurality of legitimate interests; employers and 
employees have shared as well as conflicting goals. Putting these 
assumptions together means that workplace law should help 
balance the power of employers and employees to prevent 
substandard work outcomes, promote a vibrant, participatory 
democracy, and create broadly shared prosperity.38 
In Befort and Budd’s view, then, employment law ought to be 
driven by a careful balancing of three principles—recognizing the 
importance of economic efficiency, ensuring adequate balancing of 
bargaining power between employees and employers, and 
maintaining minimum standards of social equality and democratic 
participation.39 Befort and Budd contend that “the central purpose 
of a reformed system of workplace law and public policy should be 
to balance efficiency, equity, and voice.”40 An obvious difficulty 
 
 36. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 228 (emphasis in original). 
 37. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 117–31. 
 38. Id. at 120–21. 
 39. See id. at 122. Befort and Budd recognize the importance of efficiency but urge that 
it must be subject to “social and human boundaries.” Id. at 121. In Befort and Budd’s account, 
these social and human boundaries are “equity,” which they define as “the fairness of the 
distribution and security of economic rewards[;]” and “voice,” defined as “opportunities for 
workers to shape their working lives[.]” Id. at 6, 121. Befort and Budd sometimes refer to this 
as employment “with a human face,” id. at 130, which can only be achieved “when efficiency 
is balanced with equity and voice.” Id. at 122. 
 40. Id. at 121. Befort and Budd acknowledge that it can be “difficult to know when a 
balance has been achieved.” Id. at 123. But they argue, “this does not obviate the need for 
guiding principles.” Id. They set out a “scorecard” for evaluating how well current 
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with this approach is discerning precisely where that balance lies 
for any given question within employment law. 
Finally, while it shares some common ground with the pluralist 
account, relationalism might be categorized as a fifth distinct way 
of ordering and explaining the broad field of employment law. 
Relationalism as a normative guide for employment law builds 
upon the relational theory of contract, whose chief proponent is Ian 
Macneil.41 The relational contract theory is discussed in detail 
below, in Part III. For now, it is enough simply to note that the 
critical insight of relational contract theory is that many contracts 
are characterized more by ongoing relationships with some 
elements of both competition and cooperation, than by discrete 
one-shot exchanges, where competitive elements dominate and 
each side tries to extract maximum gains from the one-shot trade.42  
To say that employment contracts may be particularly well-
suited to characterization as relational contracts is an 
understatement. While some scholars have considered the 
possibility of building employment law doctrine more explicitly 
around a recognition that employment contracts are relational, 
these efforts have been exclusively focused on the employment at-
will doctrine.43 There has been no sustained scholarly effort to 
extend a relational theory beyond the employment at-will doctrine 
and into other employment law subfields, such as workplace 
safety. This Article attempts to do just that, drawing from relational 
contract theory the guiding principle of anti-opportunism. 
The Restatement of Employment Law does not discernably 
follow any of the foregoing normative approaches to employment 
 
employment law (and potential reforms) perform on the axes of efficiency, equity, and voice. 
See id. at 6, 112. In their evaluation, Befort and Budd conclude that current U.S. employment 
law is strong in attaining economic efficiency, but weak on measures of worker voice and 
social equity. Id. at 112. 
 41. See generally IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED 
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL (David Campbell ed., 2001) [hereinafter SELECTED WORKS OF IAN 
MACNEIL]. It should be noted that Macneil routinely disclaimed that his writings included 
any normative prescriptions for the law. See Ian Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges 
and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 899 (2000) (“I challenge to a duel anyone who, after this 
notice, persists in converting my descriptions of relational contract law into prescriptions of 
what the law should be, particularly prescriptions of some universal application of relational 
contract law.”). 
 42. See generally SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL, supra note 41. 
 43. See Bird, supra note 15, passim; Marion Crain, Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment as 
Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 163, 180–81 (2011). 
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law. The Restatement reporters did not set out to resolve 
fundamental questions about the overarching purposes of 
employment law.44 Nor did the reporters consistently refer to any 
particular normative theory when explaining choices made 
between competing lines of common law authority on points of 
black letter law.45 If the reporters went about their work with a 
pluralist balancing of possible normative goals in mind, that 
balancing is not explained. Nor did the reporters leave evidence of 
the sort of careful balancing that might fit Befort and Budd’s 
explicitly pluralist formulation.46 Likewise, the reporters left no 
evidence that relationalist insights drove any of their doctrinal 
choices. Instead, the ALI’s effort was restricted to a descriptive 
exposition of key principles of the black letter law.47 
Locating a single normative justification for the entire field of 
employment law may be impossible. Some jumbled blend of  
the justifications described above, along with other distributional 
or political motivations, probably best explains the mishmash  
of individual employment law doctrines and statutory 
 
 44. See VanderVelde, supra note 22, at 362–63. 
 45. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 23 (“[W]ithout such a fundamental discussion 
[about the purpose of a separate Restatement of employment law], it would be hard to make 
it consistent with the other ALI Restatements on contract and tort or to determine what the 
Restatement of employment law ‘should be’ in choosing among competing precedents.”). 
The Reporters’ Notes to the final version of the Restatement often only identify the existence 
of authority contrary to the black letter restatement formulation, without any attempt to tie 
the choice of black letter rule to a normative theory. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW § 3.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (Reporters’ Notes) (split of authority regarding 
recognition of an implied duty of good faith in at-will employment arrangements); § 5.03 
cmt. c (Reporters’ Notes) (split of authority on whether federal law may serve as a source of 
state public policy for an employee’s tort claim). In some cases, the reporters offered cursory 
explanations for their choices, but these explanations were not clearly grounded in any 
identifiable normative principles. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 2018) (Reporters’ Notes) (“This Restatement rejects the position of those 
courts requiring employees formally to agree to any adverse change in terms from prior 
unilateral statements [of employer policy], regardless of whether the prior statement created 
vested or accrued rights. . . . Some of these holdings remain unclear.”). 
 46. See supra note 45; see generally RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW (AM. LAW  
INST. 2015). 
 47. See Estreicher et al., supra note 23, at 1247–48 (“The Restatement of Employment 
Law is not a law review article. . . . Although we are academics and have written many law 
review articles and books over the years, that was not our mission or orientation as 
Reporters. Our task and constraints were closer to those of judges. . . . The Restatement task, 
as we see it, is to articulate a relatively precise and detailed set of principles that help explain 
most results in a particular field or, at the least, provide useful guidance for judges and 
practicing lawyers laboring in the field.”). 
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interventions.48 But this recognition should not end the search for 
employment law’s normative purposes.  
This Article explores the possibility that relationalism can give 
purpose to employment law in the context of OSHA and workplace 
safety regulation. This subfield of employment law has received 
relatively little scholarly attention from employment law theorists. 
In the literature that does exist, strong adherents of economic 
efficiency theory have questioned whether any workplace safety 
regulatory interventions are necessary or wise.49 As described in 
Part III, the relational dimension of employment contracts suggests 
an important qualification on the now-dominant use of economic 
analysis in workplace safety regulation. Part III introduces the 
reader to the relational theory of contract, its chief proponent, Ian 
Macneil,50 and its implications for the development and ordering of 
employment law. 
III. THE ANTI-OPPORTUNISM PURPOSE:  
INSIGHTS FROM RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY  
Why does employment law exist apart from ordinary contract 
law? If employment is simply a contractual relationship, then why 
is a separate Restatement of Employment Law even necessary at all 
when the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is available to us? And 
why does the Restatement of Employment Law draw, in many 
places, on principles of tort and agency in combination with  
some principles of contract law to construct a seemingly 
 
 48. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 16 (“[T]he patchwork system of workplace 
law and public policy undoubtedly reflects the changing power dynamics of various interest 
groups in different eras[.]”). 
 49. The most extreme version of this argument is that OSHA should be abolished 
entirely. See John Hood, OSHA’s Trivial Pursuit; In Workplace Safety, Business Outperforms the 
Regulators, 73 POL’Y REV. 59, at 59–60 (1995); Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Abolishing 
OSHA, 4 REG. 46, 46 (1995); William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety 
and Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives that Influence 
Employer Decisions to Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9, 13–14 (1989). 
 50. See David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in SELECTED 
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL, supra note 41, at 4 (David Campbell ed., 2001) (“[Macneil’s] 
principal achievement has been that in thirty or so of the more than fifty books and articles 
he has published since 1960 he has set out the principal formulation of what has come to be 
known as ‘the relational theory’ of the law of contract.”). 
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inconsistent blend of rules that is unique to the governance of 
employment relationships?51 
The answer, of course, is that employment is not simply a 
contractual relationship.52 Special features—relational features—of 
the employment contract have long been viewed as justification for 
the application of a special set of rules to govern employment. What 
we now call employment law has its roots in the preindustrial 
English common law of “Master and Servant,” the applicability of 
which turned on the status of the individuals’ relationship.53 As 
Robert Bird notes, despite the rise of neoclassical and free-labor 
contract theories, employment, in practice, still reflects a great deal 
of interdependence between employees and employers and 
“retains much of its master-servant roots.”54 That is to say, the 
Restatement of Employment Law, as a new legal authority separate 
 
 51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2018)  
(Reporters’ Notes) (citing various provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency); Dau-Schmidt, supra 
note 20, at 10 (describing Alan Hyde’s concern, expressed at a conference of the Labor Law 
Group, that the reporters would need to “discuss what is unique about the employment 
relationship and why it needs a Restatement apart from the general Restatements of tort and 
contract.”); Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1080 n.3 (the Restatement includes pure contract and 
pure tort, as well as doctrines that are neither clearly contract nor clearly tort). 
 52. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 836 
(2017) (“But this contractual account [of employment] is incomplete. Our society has, in fact, 
imposed a series of significant duties upon employers with respect to the employment 
relationship. . . . It is not simply contractual, and it is not simply a principal-agent 
relationship. Instead, as these primarily statutory duties suggest, we view the employment 
relationship as a unique one in which both employers and employees take on significant 
responsibilities when they undertake such an arrangement.”). 
 53. See Bird, supra note 1515, at 215 (“In essence, employment law has its origins in a 
master-servant relationship, characterized by status-based relationships of profound 
interdependence.”); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One 
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 302 (2001); Robert W. 
Gordon, Using History in Teaching Contracts: The Case of Britton v. Turner, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 
423, 428 (2004) (“American courts in the early republic invented the new field of 
‘employment law’ to govern work relations in industrial society. The template they used . . . 
was lifted, however, from the pre-industrial household—from the law of Master and 
Servant.”); Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work Contract 
as Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083, 1100–01 (2015); see also Bodie, supra 
note 52, at 830–31 (recognizing pre-industrial English master-servant common law as the 
historical origin of employment law, and arguing that the shift to modern business 
organizations compels consideration of the theory of the “firm” to understand the fiduciary 
or quasi-fiduciary nature of the modern employee-employer relationship); Stephen Nayak-
Young, Revising the Roles of Master and Servant: A Theory of Work Law, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1223, 
1228 (2015) (describing work law’s “emergence from the laws of master and servant[,]” 
which was “a distinctive form of status-based law”).  
 54. See Bird, supra note 15, at 160–61. 
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from its Contract and Tort counterparts, is really just the latest 
version of a centuries-long legal tradition of treating the 
employment relation differently, precisely because of certain 
special characteristics of that relationship.55 
This Part advances the claim that any formulation of organizing 
principles of employment law must account for the uniquely 
relational aspect of the employment contract, which in turn leads 
to recognition of an anti-opportunism principle. We begin with an 
introduction to the relational theory of contract and the 
fundamental ideas about human exchange that gave rise to it.56 We 
will then identify the internal and external norms that shape 
relational expectations, followed by a discussion of how those 
relational expectations can give rise to opportunism. 
A. Relational Contract Theory 
It is probably impossible to accurately distill into a short 
summary the relational theory of contract. One complication is that 
it can only be conveyed effectively by contrasting it with the 
prevailing classical, and now neoclassical, account of contract.57 
Classical contract law is a relatively rigid, unitary body of law (with 
some contextualizing exceptions introduced in the neoclassical 
account) constructed on the fundamental assumption that 
contracting parties are rational, wealth-maximizing actors who are 
 
 55. See Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the Law 
of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 34 (2003) (arguing that “employment is not really 
a contractual relationship at all; it is, and always has been, one of status” and that “it has been 
one since time immemorial and continues to be treated so today, regardless of the legal 
theories applied”). 
 56. A comprehensive account of the theory is neither necessary nor attempted here. 
For more detail, see SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL, supra note 41. 
 57. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 805, 805 (2000) (“Like most modern contract theories, relational contract theory can only 
be understood against the backdrop of the school of classical contract law, to which it stands 
in opposition.”). Neoclassical contract law represents a modern refinement of classical 
contract law in response to critiques about the rigidity of classical contract theory and its 
resulting inability to account for different factual contexts. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational 
Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 738–39 (2000) (describing the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as neoclassical, in the sense 
that they soften and permit contextualization of classical contract doctrine); James W. Fox, 
Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
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acting within a competitive market.58 Classical contract law is 
implicitly built upon the assumption that the exchanges governed 
by contract law are essentially “discrete”—one-shot, spot market 
transactions entered into by strangers with no shared history of 
dealings, no expected future dealings, and ultimately no reason to 
act in any way cooperatively with the other party to the contract.59 
One of Macneil’s critical insights, now widely accepted, is that, 
as an empirical matter, the assumption of discrete exchange does 
not accurately reflect most contractual exchanges in the real 
world.60 In reality, all contracts take place within the context of 
some larger relation.61 Some transactions have more complex, long-
term relational components while others are less relational, or more 
“discrete.” The various types of transactions can be thought of 
along a continuum. The relational contract theory is perhaps best 
known for its depiction of a spectrum of types of transactions, 
ranging from “as-if-discrete” (but not quite perfectly discrete62) 
 
 58. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 805 (“Classical contract law . . . was axiomatic and 
deductive . . . objective and standardized . . . [and] static. It was implicitly based on a 
paradigm of bargains made between strangers transacting on a perfect market. It was based 
on a rational-actor model of psychology.”); see also Feinman, supra note 57, at 738 (“[A]s the 
realm of consensual relations, contract law simply set ground rules for self-maximizing 
private ordering.”). 
 59. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 812 (“Classical contract law was based on the 
paradigm of strangers transacting on a perfect market[.]”). 
 60. Chapin F. Cimino, The Relational Economics of Commercial Contract, 3 TEX. A&M L. 
REV. 91, 92 (2015); Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 653–54 (2010); 
see Symposium, supra note 15, at 675. 
 61. See IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 10–11 (1980); Fox, supra note 57, at 9 (“[T]he primary insight of its 
main theorist Ian Macneil, is that all contracts are relational. Contract is always a social act 
involving multiple layers of relationships.”); Macneil, supra note 15, at 881 (“First, every 
transaction is embedded in complex relations.”); Symposium, supra note 15, at 675. 
 62. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 41 (describing an arguable ambiguity regarding 
whether any perfectly discrete exchanges are truly possible); see also Eisenberg, supra note 57, 
at 821 (arguing that, because all contracts are relational, there can be no special, separate law 
of contracts for relational contracts). While all contracts will have at least some minimal 
relational components, Macneil describes, as an example of an as-if-discrete exchange, a spot 
purchase of gasoline where the parties had not previously dealt with each other, nor would 
they in the future. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 720–21 
(1974). This nuance regarding the extreme “discrete” end of the spectrum is not particularly 
relevant to discussion of employment exchanges. In even the most discrete form of 
transaction that could possibly be categorized as “employment,” (perhaps gig-work 
providing intellectual services to a purchaser on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk) there will be 
some minimal relational aspect. Questions about the level and types of relation necessary to 
trigger the status of “employee” and the protections of employment law are discussed 
further, infra Part III. 
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transactions at one end, to highly relational, long-term, complex, 
and interdependent transactions at the other end.63 
The concept of a relationalist spectrum is based on Macneil’s 
thinking on the “primal roots” of exchange between humans.64 He 
observed that once any specialization of labor is introduced into 
primal society, exchange necessarily follows; without exchange, 
specialization would cease.65 Taking an extraordinarily broad view 
of exchange and the purposes of exchange in human society, 
Macneil argues that the root of all contract is social behavior.66 That 
is: all contracts are motivated (seemingly in irrationally inconsistent 
ways) partly by cooperation and partly by competition.67 Of course, 
some contracts have stronger cooperative motivations at work than 
others. Some contracts are so predominately motivated by 
cooperation that, in the view of relationalists, classical contract law 
is relatively ill-suited to govern them.68 Macneil generally insists on 
stopping at this descriptive point,69 though his observations raise 
obvious normative questions about how the law should respond, if 
at all, to this observed phenomenon. 
The normative implications for contract law are quite uncertain 
and heavily debated by contracts scholars. Suggested possibilities 
include viewing relational contract as a complete rival to classical 
theory, such that all of contract law should be reoriented to focus 
 
 63. See MACNEIL, supra note 61, at 12–13; Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and 
the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 763, 764 (1998) (describing the spectrum); Macneil, 
supra note 15, at 894–98 (using the “as-if-discrete” language to describe the spectrum, and 
noting that the concept is “[p]robably the most recognized aspect of my work in contract”). 
 64. Feinman, supra note 57, at 741 (“Macneil begins with the ‘primal roots of contract,’ 
and this beginning leads him to broad definitions of ‘contract’ and ‘exchange’ . . . .”); Cimino, 
supra note 60, at 97. 
 65. See MACNEIL, supra note 61, at 2–3; Campbell, supra note 50, at 46–47; Ian R. 
Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 485 (1985). 
 66. See Cimino, supra note 60, at 97. 
 67. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 49 (“The basic claim is that co-operation is an 
integral part of any sort of society displaying an at all settled diversity of roles . . . .”); Cimino, 
supra note 60, at 101 (“Relational contract theory takes it as a given that all exchange is both 
competitive and cooperative. In this respect, exchange is unavoidably dualistic. Macneil 
explained that exchange is unavoidably dualistic because human nature is dualistic.”). 
 68. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 18. 
 69. Macneil, supra note 15, at 894–99 (“I challenge to a duel anyone who, after this 
notice, persists in converting my descriptions of relational contract law into prescriptions of 
what the law should be, particularly prescriptions of some universal application of relational 
contract law.”). Nonetheless, Macneil does go on to offer a carefully-limited general 
prescription that “relational contract law should generally track the relational behavior and 
norms found in the relations to which it applies.” Id. at 900. 
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on analyzing the norms relevant to each individual relationship at 
issue;70 applying a special set of relational contract standards to 
those contracts falling toward the relational end of the  
spectrum;71 making modest doctrinal changes (such as imposing 
duties of good faith, looking to course of dealing, etc.) for all or 
some contracts in recognition of their partly cooperative 
motivation;72 or doing nothing.73 Some argue that there can be no 
special contract law applicable to only relational contracts, because  
distinguishing between relational and discrete contracts is 
operationally impossible.74 
For our purposes, we need not resolve this long-running debate 
about the implications of relational theory for contract law. We are 
concerned here with the theory’s implications for employment law, 
an area of law that has already been—in fact, has always been—
singled out for special treatment apart from ordinary contract law. 
Employment law is somewhat unique in this regard. As classical or 
neoclassical contract law began to appear ill-suited to govern 
certain types of agreements, several specialized sub-areas broke 
away from general contract law and developed independently (e.g., 
commercial transactions, insurance, collective bargaining labor 
relations, secured transactions).75 
But employment law, with its historical roots in master-servant 
common law, was status-based law from its origin; only later did 
jurists infuse it with some classical contract ideas during the apex 
 
 70. Feinman, supra note 57, at 740–43 (presenting an account of “what a truly relational 
contract law would look like”); see Leib, supra note 60, at 664 (“[M]ore thoroughgoing 
relationalists . . . would have contract law develop a generalized law to apply to all or most 
contracts, in light of their relational nature.”). 
 71. See Leib, supra note 60, at 664 (“[I]t is only one brand of the normative claim [of 
relationalism] that seeks special treatment for a small class of relational contracts . . . .”). 
 72. Id. at 661–63 (noting that these reforms have largely already been accomplished by 
the U.C.C. and refinements to the common law). 
 73. Cimino, supra note 60, at 91–92 (identifying the contradiction that “most legal 
scholars accept the core insight” of relational contract theory, yet “many of these same 
contract scholars believe that there is nothing contract law could or should do about it.”). 
 74. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 817 (“There can be no special law of relational 
contracts, because relational contracts and contracts are virtually one and the same.”). But 
see Leib, supra note 60, at 665 (arguing that “Eisenberg fails to prove that there is no way to 
operationalize a law of relational contracts” because he has not shown that standards, as 
opposed to rules, are incapable of accomplishing the task). 
 75. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 7 (quoting Ian R. Macneil, Whither Contracts?, 21 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 403, 403 (1969)); Feinman, supra note 57, at 738–40. 
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of the free labor contract movement.76 Employment law’s existence 
as a separate field of law has always been justified by special aspects 
of the employer-employee relationship. These aspects both set it 
apart from the paradigmatic “as-if-discrete” exchanges and trigger 
duties apart from those expressed in any manifestation of their 
contractual agreement. Neoclassical contract law ideas and rules 
have, of course, worked their way into the Restatement of 
Employment Law, but they have never completely governed the 
employment relationship. Quite the contrary, special status rules 
formerly completely governed the employment relationship, and the 
infusion of neoclassical contract concepts came later. 
Return to the question at the outset of Part II: What is the 
purpose of employment law generally? Whether one subscribes 
primarily to an efficiency view, a bargaining power view, an equity 
view, or a pluralistic view, my position here is that the partly 
cooperative nature of the employment relation cannot be 
completely ignored in any theoretical account of employment law. 
If employment law is to continue as a separate legal field apart from 
contract law, then the existence of cooperative motivations must 
play some role in defining the purposes of employment law, and in 
the resulting articulation of the rules or standards that will govern 
the cases. My claim here is that no coherent articulation of first 
principles of employment law, or any subfield of employment law, 
can be advanced without proper regard for the degree of partly 
cooperative, interdependent motivations that underlie the 
employment relationship, as revealed by the key insight of 
relational contract theory.77 
In one sense, the claim that employment law must account for 
the relational aspect of employment is really just a reminder that 
employment law itself actually is relational contract law. I say 
 
 76. Marion Crain, supra note 43; Gordon, supra note 53, at 427–28 (“‘Contract’ in 1800, 
generally referred to relations that the parties agreed to enter voluntarily, but that once 
entered bound them to prescribed terms.”); Snyder, supra note 55, at 42 (“In the 19th century 
employment law and contract law suddenly came together.”). The infusion was never 
complete. Snyder observes that even at the height of the deployment of contractual rhetoric 
in employment law cases during the Lochner era, “most employment law still turned on 
questions of status, not contract.” Id. at 45. 
 77. See Macneil, supra note 15, at 898–99 (“This observation [that a great deal of 
relational contract law, in fact, exists] does not mean that relational contracts can never be 
dealt with by relatively discrete contract law. . . . It does mean, however that discrete contract 
law can never be the beginning and the end of the law applicable to relational contracts.”). 
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“reminder” because I am certainly not the first to note that 
employment is a relational contract or that the field of employment 
law is relational contract law.78 Macneil himself cited employment 
and labor statutes as primary illustrative examples of relational 
contract law.79 Professor Bird published Employment as a Relational 
Contract in 2005.80 Stewart Schwab, in 1993, hypothesized that 
certain exceptions to the at-will employment default rule might be 
justified based on a “life cycle” model of career employment that 
takes into account the longer-term relationship dynamics between 
an employer and employee.81 If my claim here is just a reminder, 
however, it is a warranted one. Rachel Arnow-Richman, in a recent 
symposium on relational contracts, observed that in the field of 
employment law disputed issues are often resolved as though 
formal (neoclassical) contract rules applied, without reference to 
the parties’ broader employment relationship.82 Despite the efforts 
of Bird, Arnow-Richman, and others, most scholarly critiques of 
current employment law generally are not grounded in relational 
contract theory.83 
But in an important sense, my claim here is more than just a 
reminder. If the project of identifying the guiding normative 
purpose(s) of employment law is ever to succeed, then the 
successful account must acknowledge and accommodate the 
cooperative motivation of employment relationships, and must 
 
 78. See sources cited supra note 15. 
 79. See Macneil, supra note 15, at 897. In his early work, Macneil expected to find his 
relational contract insights in the existing literature stemming from the field of labor 
relations, and found it in Philip Selznick’s Law Society and Industrial Justice (1969). See Ian R. 
Macneil, Reflections on Relational Contract, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.  
541, 541 (1985). But see Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 820–21 (contending that the employment 
statutes cited by Macneil, including the Act, do not actually constitute a form of  
contract law). 
 80. Bird, supra note 15; see also Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied 
Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 395–99 (2008) (describing Bird’s 
framework for application of relational contract principles to employment). 
 81. Schwab, supra note 24, at 11–13. 
 82. See Symposium, supra note 15, at 681 (“What you find in the employment context 
is that, although relationships are extremely important to the parties, the legal issues that 
arise often are not resolved in the manner you would expect. In fact, relatively little of 
employment contract law follows a relational approach and reaches what we might consider 
correct relational results.”). 
 83. See id. at 706 (Arnow-Richman observing: “While employment scholars . . . have 
been critical of such decisions [applying traditional contract law], I think it is fair to say that 
those critiques generally have not sounded in relational contract theory”). 
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also recognize that the degree of cooperative motivation will 
necessarily vary in different employment contexts. This recognition 
would rule out a pure efficiency-based purpose for all of 
employment law, which acknowledges no exceptions for the 
influence of cooperative motivations. The microeconomic theory 
that forms the basis of the economic efficiency normative 
justification, and that also provides the template for any formal 
economic modeling of competing legal rules, assumes self-
interested competition by rational utility maximizers under certain 
stylized market conditions.84 More sophisticated economic 
accounts that strive to model adjustments to assumptions of 
rationality and perfect information will more closely approximate 
a relational account, but these generally do not fully incorporate 
cooperative motivations.85 Relational contract theory, as discussed 
above, is rooted in the notion that exchanges—especially those 
falling closer to the relational end of the discrete/relational 
spectrum—are characterized by both competitive (“utility 
maximizing”) and cooperative (“solidarity enhancing”) 
motivations, thus undermining both the factual predictions and the 
normative claims of the neoclassical economic model.86 
 
 84. See generally POSNER, supra note 26, at 3 (“As conceived in this book, economics is 
the science of rational choice in a world—our world—in which resources are limited in 
relation to human wants. The task of economics, so defined, is to explore the implications of 
assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions—what we shall 
call his ‘self-interest.’”); Campbell, supra note 50, at 13 (“Neo-classical economics assumes 
that rational economic action is motivated by a form of pure selfishness which it terms 
rational individual utility maximization.”). 
85 See Campbell, supra note 50, at 35 (Macneil argued that his relational theory tried to 
capture a “sense of co-operation that will always escape even [Oliver E.] Williamson’s 
reasoning from what remain neo-classical assumptions of individual utility maximization, 
even though Williamson may attempt to model such co-operation in broadly game-
theoretical, and increasingly complex . . .terms.” 
 86. See, e.g., Jay Fienman, The Reception of Ian Macneil’s Work on Contract in the USA, in 
SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL, supra note 41, at 62 (“[W]ealth maximization becomes 
only one among many factors motivating people to engage in contractual relationships and 
to be considered by courts in evaluating those relationships. . . . In the neo-classical view, 
contracts are exchanges entered it to for gain. In the relational view, contracts are social 
relationships in which economic gain is an important factor but, particularly in intertwined 
relationships of long standing not the only factor.”) (citations omitted); Ian R. Macneil, 
Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567, 589 (1986) (“The 
constant conflict between the utility maximizer and the solidarity enhancer in each person 
always creates two-dimensional social relations. Any single-dimension model can have no 
legitimate claims to social completeness. Thus typical utilitarian models purporting to be 
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This is not to say that economic efficiency analysis is misguided. 
Efficiency remains an important and worthy goal of employment 
law. In some contexts, efficiency concerns may predominate over 
competing goals suggested by partly-cooperative motivations, 
leading legislation or doctrine to develop accordingly. Recognizing 
the conflicting competitive and cooperative motivations of  
actors in the labor market does not mean that economic analysis 
offers no insight. It only requires that efficiency determinations  
be placed into a larger relational context. The governing  
principles of any subfield of employment law can be formulated 
with an understanding of what neoclassical microeconomic  
theory would prescribe as the efficiency-maximizing rule,  
while maintaining flexibility to adopt an alternate rule if necessary, 
in light of the cooperative motivations underlying the  
employment relationship.87 
Although not couched in terms of Macneil’s relational contract 
theory, Befort and Budd describe the building blocks of their 
pluralist model of employment in terms that would be quite 
familiar to relational contract theorists: 
The model of the pluralist employment relationship . . . assumes 
that there are multiple parties (e.g., employers and employees) 
with legitimate but sometimes conflicting interests—employers 
might want lower labor costs, flexibility, and an intense pace of 
work while employees might want higher wages, employment 
security, and a safe workplace—as well as shared interests such 
 
complete analyses of behavior—whether micro or macro—are not merely unsound at the 
periphery, but at the center as well since the conflict in human nature itself is not logically 
reconcilable within one consistent system.”). 
 87. Robert Bird demonstrated as much in analyzing the employment at-will doctrine 
in the United States. While neoclassical microeconomic analysis suggests that the current at-
will doctrine in the United States efficiently maximizes social welfare, see Epstein, supra note 
24, at 976, 982, Bird points out that this efficiency-based conclusion can and ought to be 
tempered by an understanding of relational contract principles. Bird, supra note 15, at 207–
08. He argues for a flexible “relational opportunism” standard in employment termination 
cases that accounts for contract norms shaped by an employer’s promises and practices. Id. 
at 196–208. This standard would prevent employers from taking advantage of employees’ 
information deficit regarding the discrepancy between the law of at-will employment and 
the psychological employment contract created by an employer’s promises and practices. Id.; 
see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of 
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (finding that 
employees broadly and mistakenly believe they are legally protected from termination by a 
standard other than the at-will default rule). 
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as quality products, productive workers, and profitable 
companies. 
. . . 
Institutions and customs shape these interactions and are 
therefore essential determinants of employment outcomes.88 
Exactly how cooperative motivations and the contract norms of 
an employment exchange should be taken into account is a difficult 
question necessarily bound up in the context of the subfield of 
employment law at issue and also in the specific employment 
relationship at issue.89 Closer examination of the common contract 
norms and external norms that guide and shape the parties’ 
behavior is required.90 
B. Internal and External Norms 
In relational contract theory, the specific facts of each exchange 
relationship are “filtered through the structure of the relational 
method,” including a consideration of common contract norms,91 
as well as external norms. In Macneil’s account, certain contract 
norms (such as the parties’ effectuation of consent) play a larger 
role in more discrete contracts, while other norms (such as the 
preservation of the relation) play a larger role in contracts falling 
toward the relational end of the spectrum.92 
 
 88. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 12–13. Befort and Budd’s reference to “institutions 
and customs” may align well with the internal and external norms referenced by Professor 
Macneil. Id. 
 89. See Feinman, supra note 57, at 742 (“Relational analysis is contextual with a 
vengeance, immersing itself in the facts of the particular contract and of the contexts from 
which it arises.”). 
 90. See Cimino, supra note 60, at 98 & n.25 (“[Macneil] called them norms because he 
saw them as descriptions of the normal nature of all contract activity.”). 
 91. See Feinman, supra note 57, at 742. Macneil identified ten common contract norms, 
including:  
(1) role integrity (requiring consistency, involving internal conflict, and being 
inherently complex), (2) reciprocity (simply stated as the principle of getting 
something back for something given), (3) implementation of planning, (4) 
effectuation of consent, (5) flexibility, (6) contractual solidarity, (7) the restitution, 
reliance, and expectation interests (the ”linking norms”), (8) creation and restraint 
of power (the ”power norm”), (9) propriety of means, and (10) harmonization with 
the social matrix.  
Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 347 (1983) 
(footnote call numbers omitted). 
 92. Feinman, supra note 57, at 742. 
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These internal contract norms play an important role in 
interpreting the parties’ expectations and obligations under 
relational contract theory. Macneil’s theory “includes the 
possibility that norms internal to the parties’ relationship but not 
clearly expressed in the agreement will become part of their 
obligation to each other.”93 By definition, these norms will vary 
with the circumstances of each employment exchange and can be 
difficult to identify. But some generalization is possible where 
many employment exchanges carry similar features. In the context 
of job security, Robert Bird pointed to “psychological contracts,”94 
“company credos” or “corporate codes,”95 and “organizational 
cultures”96 as sources of internal relational contract norms.97 Given 
the prevalence of corporate codes, credos, and employee 
handbooks, a significant percentage of employment relations share 
some similar (though not identical) internal norms.98 
External norms also guide the parties’ behavior and 
expectations. External norms are those imposed by the positive 
laws of the sovereign, as well as the expectations imposed by trade 
associations or customs.99 They are the larger social context against 
 
 93. Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 823, 827 (2000). 
 94. Bird defined psychological contracts as “an employee’s perception of the mutual 
obligations that exist between the employee and her employer. Not contracts in the legal 
sense, psychological contracts emerge when an employee perceives that contributions she 
makes obligate her employer to reciprocal acts.” Bird, supra note 15, at 165 (footnote call 
numbers omitted). 
 95. A company credo or code “is a document developed by an organization that 
expresses that organization’s values and the ethical rules it expects employees to follow.” Id. 
at 170. 
 96. Bird defined corporate culture as “internal consistency within an organization that 
influences the behavior and values of its employees. . . . A corporate culture represents the 
cumulative philosophies, beliefs, values, assumptions, and norms of an organization.” Id. at 
180–81 (internal footnote citations omitted). More colloquially, a corporate culture is a 
“feeling in the organization, to rules of the game, to how things are done around here.” Id. 
at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Alan M. Wilson, Understanding 
Organizational Culture and the Implications for Corporate Meetings, 35 EUR. J. MARKETING 353, 
355 (2001)). 
 97. See id. at 165–85. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Macneil, supra note 91, at 367–68 (“[External social values] would also have to 
include private law, such as that imposed on professional football teams by league rules, on 
businesses by trade associations, on colleges and universities by the American Association 
of University Professors, and on family life by churches. Furthermore, it could not stop with 
relatively hierarchical or vertical impositions such as those listed. It also would have to deal 
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which the exchange is entered into by the parties, which helps 
shape the parties’ relational expectations.100 
The sources, contours, and roles of external and internal norms 
will vary with the circumstances of each individual employment 
exchange. And they will also vary when ascertaining employer or 
employee obligations in each of the subfields that make up the 
mishmash of employment law, including the at-will termination 
default rule, employee mobility restrictions, employee intellectual 
property, workplace privacy, workplace safety, employment 
discrimination, employee speech, wage and hour regulation, and 
so on. The next subpart draws on relational contract theory (as well 
as other sources) to identify anti-opportunism as a potential 
guiding principle in the subfield of worker safety law. 
C. An Anti-Opportunism Principle 
A signature characteristic of relationalism is the need to 
examine individual exchanges within their own context, including 
the internal and external norms guiding the parties’ behavior.101 In 
doing so, relationalists look to prevent or deter opportunism by the 
parties to the exchange.102 Macneil defined “opportunism” as “self-
interest seeking contrary to the principles of the relation in which it 
occurs.”103 Robert Bird, examining opportunism in the context of 
job security, defined “relational opportunism” as “self-interest 
seeking that contradicts the terms of an established relational 
contract.”104 As an example of relational opportunism, Bird pointed 
to an employer who encourages loyalty with implicit (though not 
 
with more horizontal imposition of external values, such as those arising from customs—not 
only those customs of closely related people or groups, such as customs of a trade, but also 
customs of broader origin, such as those of civilized intercourse in the particular society.”); 
see also Campbell, supra note 50, at 14; Feinman, supra note 57, at 742. 
 100. See Macneil, supra note 91, at 367–68. 
 101. See Feinman, supra note 57. 
 102. Speidel, supra note 93, at 838 (“Both relationalists and transaction-cost economists 
recognize the importance of preventing opportunism in relational contracts. . . . In short, 
opportunism threatens the relationship. If the contract does not have a governance structure 
to regulate or define opportunism, or if that structure fails and the parties cannot agree, a 
court may be asked to intervene.”). For an argument that precontractual commercial 
negotiations ought to be protected by a legal claim proscribing opportunistic behavior, see 
G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a 
New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221 (1991). 
 103. Bird, supra note 15, at 198 n.383 (quoting Macneil, supra note 2, at 1024 n.20). 
 104. Id. at 198. 
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contractually-binding) promises that an employee’s job is secure 
and that the employee will be treated fairly, but who “then retracts 
that security and fair treatment when they prove inconvenient.”105 
Other scholars, outside the self-described relationalists, have 
also identified the prevention of opportunism as a desirable goal 
for employment law. Matthew Bodie, drawing on the economic 
theory of the firm and its modern variants, argues that the 
discretion lodged in both employers and employees over certain 
aspects of the employment relationship within a firm creates 
possibilities for opportunistic behavior.106 Bodie contends that, 
where employees have little say in governance, “they have no way 
to address the employer’s discretion, their own vulnerability to that 
discretion, and the opportunism and agency costs inherent in the 
relationship.”107 Noting Professor Bird’s similar arguments drawn 
from relational contract theory, Bodie urges a type of fiduciary 
duty—a “duty not to use its discretion to take undue advantage of 
employees, either individually or as a group.”108 
The heavily relational character of employment contracts, 
together with the areas of discretion built-in to modern firm 
structures, present a heightened risk of opportunism in 
employment. Many of the special common law and statutory duties 
(running in both directions) that permeate employment law can be 
best explained as rules designed to anticipate and defeat forms  
of opportunism by employers or employees. Both Professors Bird 
and Bodie focused primarily on job security and the at-will 
employment rule in analyzing the potential for opportunism  
in employment exchanges,109 but the law of workplace safety 
likewise ought to reflect this basic anti-opportunism principle.  
 
 105. Id. at 199. 
 106. See Bodie, supra note 52, at 864. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  
 109. See Bird, supra note 15 at 196–200; Bodie, supra note 52, at 864. Professor Schwab’s 
life-cycle theory likewise focused on the possibility of opportunism in the context of job 
security, the at-will employment rule, and courts’ willingness to scrutinize terminations at 
points in the employment life cycle that seemed most vulnerable to the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior by employers. See Schwab, supra note 24, at 39 (“Courts are most 
likely to scrutinize firings at the beginning and end of the life cycle. Courts do not get 
involved during midcareer unless they see an obvious case of particular opportunism, such 
as a firing before a pension vests or a sales commission is due.”). 
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The next Part considers the implications of the anti-opportunism 
purpose for OSHA. 
IV. BEYOND THE EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATION IN WORKPLACE SAFETY: 
ANTI-OPPORTUNISM AND ITS COROLLARIES 
This Part narrows the focus from employment law generally to 
workplace safety law specifically. The few scholars that have 
brought relational contract theory to bear on employment law have 
focused on the at-will employment rule. Those works have either 
not touched on workplace safety at all, or have considered it only 
briefly in passing.110 My focus on workplace safety law is motivated 
in part by recent and anticipated changes in the landscape of 
workplace safety regulation, including potential challenges to 
OSHA’s expansive approach to the general duty clause along the 
lines urged by Judge Kavanaugh.111 
This Part begins by briefly exploring the dominant efficiency 
analysis approach to workplace safety law. It then lays out an 
alternative, anti-opportunism view, sketching a set of corollaries 
informed by relationalism. 
A. The Efficiency Account of Workplace Safety Law 
As with other subfields of employment law, the scholarship on 
workplace safety is currently dominated by the economic efficiency 
 
 110. While not claiming to apply relational theory, Befort and Budd do briefly consider 
the implications of their pluralist approach for workplace safety and health law. See BEFORT 
& BUDD, supra note 26, at 162–63. Likewise, Bodie, examining employment through the lens 
of the theory of the firm rather than relational contract, identifies certain employer duties to 
employees in the subfield of workplace safety that resemble fiduciary duties. See Bodie, supra 
note 52, at 837–38 (claiming employers have a common law duty to provide a reasonably 
safe workplace, and OSHA supplementation of that duty through the general duty clause). 
 111. See Gonzalez, supra note 10 (“[T]he agency is more actively relying on the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause to cite industries for violations 
where there is no specific standard, such as ergonomics, workplace violence and heat 
stress/illness hazards.”). The current presidential administration’s deregulatory emphasis 
may limit OSHA’s approach to the general duty clause. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,771, 
82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Collin Warren, The OSHA Story Under Trump, LAW 360 (Mar. 
21, 2017, 11:20 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/902113/the-osha-story-under-
trump (emphasizing deregulation and requiring the elimination of two rules for every  
rule enacted). 
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paradigm and economic analysis.112 With some notable exceptions, 
critiques to the orthodox law-and-economics prescriptions are 
usually couched in later-generation economic terms, including the 
identification of market failures, externalities, transaction costs, 
information asymmetries, and behavioral economics or bounded-
rationality critiques.113 
The efficiency-maximizing account of worker safety regulation 
is as follows. Workers and employers freely enter into employment 
contracts where workers exchange their labor and their time for 
wages and benefits. Express or implicit in these contracts is an 
acknowledgement that workers are agreeing to expose themselves 
to certain risks of the job. Workers receive compensating wage 
differentials in return for taking on risk. And risk-preferring 
workers can seek out those employers who would rather pay wage 
differentials than incur greater expenses to reduce risks. By 
matching the risk preferences of workers with appropriate 
employers, the free market maximizes efficiency in labor 
exchanges. Only where a systematic market failure is identified 
should the government intervene—and then, only in the manner 
 
 112. See, e.g., CHRISTINE JOLLS, Employment Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1349, 1355 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); W. KIP VISCUSI, 
RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE (1983); Henry N. 
Butler & Keith W. Chauvin, Economic Analysis of Labor Markets: A Framework for Analyzing 
Employment Law Issues, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1998); Lambert, supra note 13; Jonathan S. 
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010); Walter Y. 
Oi, On the Economics of Industrial Safety, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 669 (1974); Sunstein, supra 
note 14; W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1436 (1996) (“The 
most comprehensive regulatory test from an economic efficiency standpoint is benefit-cost 
analysis.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Transmitting the Costs of Unsafe Work, 54 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 463, 465 (2017); Charlotte S. Alexander, Transparency and Transmission: Theorizing 
Information’s Role in Regulatory and Market Responses to Workplace Problems, 48 CONN. L. REV. 
177 (2015); Jason R. Bent, Health Theft, 48 CONN. L. REV. 637 (2016); Martha T. McCluskey, The 
Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 723–24 (1998); 
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Necessity of OSHA, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22 (1999). But see David 
M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2011) (arguing that distributional considerations are a rational 
justification for application of a feasibility standard, rather than an efficiency-maximizing 
cost-benefit standard, under the Act); Sidney A. Shapiro, Dying at Work: Political Discourse 
and Occupational Safety and Health, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 831, 841–46 (2014) (arguing that 
the dominance of cost-benefit analysis undermines the democratic goal of protecting 
workers as a social objective). 
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minimally necessary to correct the identified market failure.114 
Accordingly, some efficiency-minded scholars have advocated (for 
example) that OSHA standards be opt-out standards, because the 
only identified market failure is one of inadequate information in 
the possession of workers, which can be corrected with an 
information-forcing opt-out standard.115 
Regarding compensation post-injury, the efficiency-
maximizing account posits that the likelihood of recovering all or a 
portion of any loss due to injury or illness will be factored into the 
market price for risky work and will also be factored into the 
employer’s willingness to pay for precautions. If a worker  
expects that, upon injury, she will automatically receive 67% of her 
lost wages, plus the full payment of medical expenses, in a typical 
no-fault workers’ compensation regime, she will adjust her 
demand for compensating wages accordingly. On the other hand, 
if recovery of the losses against the employer were unlikely, as it 
would be in a tort regime following strong versions of the 
traditional Unholy Trinity defenses,116 then she will demand 
appropriately higher wages to compensate her for the risk of 
incurring an injury that would leave her with no legal  
recourse. Employers should theoretically take precautions up to the 
point at which the marginal cost of additional precautions  
equals the marginal benefit in reduced liability or reduced 
insurance premiums.117 
The foregoing efficiency-maximizing account of the worker 
safety exchange is often buttressed by empirical evidence 
suggesting that workers do, in fact, receive some compensating 
 
 114. JOLLS, supra note 112, at 1357 (“The general starting point for economic analysis of 
workplace safety regulation is the observation that in the absence of market failure, less safe 
working conditions should be fully compensated by higher wages—an application of the 
theory of equalizing wage differentials.”); Thomas A. Lambert, supra note 13, at 1008 
(arguing that, for an information asymmetry market failure, the proper response is not to 
ban the exchange, but rather to narrowly address the information problem directly by 
requiring information disclosure). 
 115. See Lambert, supra note 13, at 1070–71, 1078. 
 116. The Unholy Trinity defenses included the fellow-servant rule, assumption of the 
risk, and contributory negligence. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in 
Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1769 (1981). 
 117. See Lambert, supra note 13, at 1018–19. 
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wage differential for certain riskier jobs. The empirical evidence on 
that point, though, is far from conclusive.118 
B. Beyond Efficiency: A Relational Account of the Risk Exchange 
Relational contract theory offers an alternative way to think 
about workplace safety laws. A relational account of workplace 
safety begins by returning to examine the fundamental roots of the 
exchange at issue and then understanding the contract norms that 
have developed internally or externally to guide the participants’ 
expectations in that exchange.119 In the employment exchange, one 
party trades his or her labor to another party who is able to pay for 
it and has the capital necessary to put the labor to productive use. 
A careful exploration of the fundamental components, the 
motivations, and the internal and external norms of the 
employment exchange will help illuminate this account. 
1. Health is property 
In understanding the occupational risk exchange, the first thing 
to recognize—frequently overlooked in the literature—is that an 
employee’s health is the employee’s property.120 The employment 
exchange is not just an employee agreeing to exchange her time and 
her labor efforts in return for wages and/or benefits, but also 
 
 118. Compare W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 112, at 40–41 (finding 
the existence of compensating wage premiums), with Shapiro, The Necessity of OSHA, supra 
note 113, at 24 (“[T]he literature on wage premiums offers only equivocal support that wage 
premiums are adequate to compensate workers for their occupational risks or that they even 
exist.”), and Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited, 
52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116 (1998) (questioning the variables included in several empirical 
studies of wage differentials). 
 119. The discussion of external and internal norms that follows makes a typical 
assumption that even more fundamental basic societal norms (sometimes called first and 
second level norms) recognized by Macneil are satisfied. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 12–
13, 43. These norms require that the parties have shared language or meaning, such that 
forming an exchange is possible, and that they experience a shared social solidarity, such 
that they can expect general social peace (rather than simple violence allowing one party to 
impose its will on another) and some mechanism for the enforcement of promises. See id. 
 120. Macneil notes that the existence of defined property rights is a critical prerequisite 
to effective exchange. Macneil, supra note 65, at 491 (“We know that property, the 
prerequisite of discrete exchange, was the legal fundament throughout the period [1865–
1933], followed closely by liberty, at least insofar as the sale of labor was concerned.”). That 
an employee has a property interest in his or her health appears to be implicit in the theory 
of compensating wage differentials, but it is nonetheless often overlooked once attention 
turns to prescribing appropriate legal rules to govern workplace safety. 
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involves a health risk exchange. The employee gives not only her 
leisure time and her labor efforts, but also agrees to bear a risk to 
her health that she was otherwise under no obligation to assume. 
Risks to the employee’s health constitute one of the commodities 
being exchanged as part of the overall employment bargain 
between the parties. Recognition of the role of the employee’s 
health as property in this health risk exchange becomes important 
as we explore the unstated, implied contractual obligations of  
the parties. 
2. Both competitive and cooperative motivations 
The health risk component of the exchange between the 
employee and employer is complex, including both competitive 
and cooperative motivations. As Macneil emphasized, this seeming 
inconsistency in pursuing both competitive and cooperative goals 
is just a reflection of the irrational duality of human nature in 
pursuing both social and individualistic goals simultaneously.121 
The competitive motivations in the risk exchange are apparent. 
An employee will seek to undertake less risk to his health on the 
job, all else held constant. Factoring in an individual employee’s 
risk preferences,122 competitive motivations will lead the employee 
to pursue the optimal mix of low safety risk with high wages or 
benefits received in return for his work. Employers, on the other 
hand, are generally motivated to reduce production costs and 
maximize profits, which may impose increased risks on the 
employee’s health.123 
Line speeds at poultry or meat processing plants offer a modern 
illustration of competitive motivations.124 Employees will generally 
prefer slower processing line speeds, all else held constant, because 
they are safer. Employers will prefer faster line speeds, all else held 
constant, because they would reduce production time and labor 
 
 121. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 122. Any given employee may be risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-preferring. A 
relatively risk-averse employee will choose a mix that prioritizes safety, even at the cost of 
somewhat reduced wages. 
 123. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 11–12 (“[E]mployers might want lower labor 
costs, flexibility, and an intense pace of work while employees might want higher wages, 
employment security, and a safe workplace . . . .”). 
 124. See generally SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Unsafe at These Speeds (Mar. 01, 
2013), https://www.splcenter.org/20130228/unsafe-these-speeds. 
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costs, maximizing profits. The interests of employee and employer, 
specifically regarding the occupational safety risks to employees, 
are in direct opposition to each other. 
But cooperative motivations are present as well, undercutting 
some critical assumptions of efficiency theory. First, employees and 
employers both want the company to profit and succeed. 
Employers, so that investors will maximize their return on 
investment. Employees, so that the company will be stable, 
providing a predictable opportunity to continue working and 
perhaps also an opportunity to share in the company’s success 
through improved wages or benefits. Because of these shared 
motivations, both employers and employees in the business of 
processing poultry have an incentive to produce safe, reputable, 
high-quality products. If line speeds are too fast, unsafe food 
products may escape detection, enter the distribution chain, and 
sicken consumers, threatening profits and perhaps the survival of 
the company and the continued employment opportunity.125 
Employers also have an interest in keeping their employees healthy 
and avoiding excessive injuries or illnesses. Replacing an injured or 
ill employee can introduce additional training costs, monitoring 
costs, or other uncertainties. 
Relational contract theory acknowledges the simultaneous and 
seemingly contradictory existence of both competitive and 
cooperative motivations in all contracts. More discrete contracts 
tend to be dominated by competitive motivations, while more 
relational contracts tend to be characterized by significant 
cooperative motivations. 
3. Evolving external norms 
External norms about employers’ obligations in workplace 
safety (both in prevention and compensation) have been quite 
unstable over the last three centuries. Understanding the historical 
evolution of these external norms helps to situate the current 
uncertainty simmering in workplace safety law. 
In seventeenth and eighteenth century England, the 
responsibility of caring for individuals rendered unable to work 
 
 125. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 12 (providing examples of “shared interests 
such as quality products, productive workers, and profitable companies”). 
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due to injury fell to the local parishes under the Poor Law.126 The 
English Poor Laws were the primary influence on the treatment of 
the poor in the American colonies.127 This meant that in many 
colonies, religious groups took on the responsibility of caring for 
the poor, including injured or ill workers.128 In the American South, 
private landowners often provided local poor assistance.129 Parish 
or town responsibility for the injured underpinned Lord 
Mansfield’s reasoning in 1784, in determining that a master was not 
legally liable to care for a sick or injured servant.130 
Lord Mansfield contrasted the parish’s legal responsibility with 
another common avenue of potential relief for an injured worker — 
an employer’s benevolence. While not legally obligated to provide 
for the injured servant, Lord Mansfield believed that masters 
morally “ought to,” and they often did.131 The moral norm reflected 
in Lord Mansfield’s reasoning pre-dated the free labor movement 
and its importation of classical contract ideas into the master-
servant relationship. According to Christopher Tomlins, legal 
 
 126. See Michael Ashley Stein, Victorian Tort Liability for Workplace Injuries, 2008 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 933, 942 (2008) (“Responsibility for medical care traditionally fell upon parishes 
through the aegis of the Old (meaning, pre-1834) Poor Law . . . .”); Christopher L. Tomlins, 
A Mysterious Power: Industrial Accidents and the Legal Construction of Employment Relations in 
Massachusetts, 1800-1850, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 375, 396 (1988) (quoting Lord Mansfield in Newby 
v. Wiltshire (1784)). When a servant was injured or had fallen ill outside of the servant’s home 
parish, the parish where the worker had become injured or ill was generally required to 
provide care until the servant could be “removed” to the servant’s own parish. See Stein, 
supra at 942. 
 127. See William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31 
U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 42–43 (1996) (“While individual economic and social circumstances shaped 
each colony’s response to its poor, the English poor laws were usually the frame of reference 
for local action.”). 
 128. See id. at 47 (“Poor relief was accepted as a prime responsibility of religious groups 
in many parts of the United States. Private church aid existed parallel to the systems later 
created and maintained by the public authorities.”). 
 129. See id. (explaining that Southern landowners were motivated, in part, by a desire 
to maintain a social system akin to feudalism). 
 130. Newby v. Wiltshire, 2 Esp. 739, 742, 170 Eng. Rep. 515, 516 (K.B.1784) (“I think, in 
general, a master ought to maintain his servants, and take care of them in sickness; but the 
question now is, what is the law? There is, in point of law, no action against the master to 
compel him to repay the parish for the cure of his servant; no authority whatsoever has been 
cited, and it seems to me that it cannot be. The parish is bound to take care of accidents . . . .”). 
 131. See id. Some other eighteenth century cases did recognize a master’s duty to pay 
medical expenses in some cases. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort 
Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 701, n.370 (1989); Tomlins, supra note 126, at 396. As Professor 
Schwartz notes, the “availability of the parish or town as an alternative bearer of liability for 
disabled and impoverished workers greatly complicates the effort to understand what these 
early cases and legal rules were all about.” Schwartz, supra at 701, n.370. 
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historians “have generally agreed that a paternalistic sense of social 
responsibility or ‘stewardship’ was a key component of early 
corporate ideology.”132 
By the late 1830s and the 1840s, however, an injured employee’s 
likelihood of recovering more than the “merest pittance” in 
corporate benevolence had dwindled.133 Tomlins ascribes this 
development to the “growing emphasis upon profit and 
productivity,” i.e., the “political economy of speed” that prevailed 
in the 1830s and 1840s.134 Injured or sick workers took to the courts 
seeking legal recourse, resulting in the earliest American cases 
seeking to impose liability on employers for injuries to 
employees.135 The expected value of any post-injury benevolence 
disappeared after employees had already invested in this 
occupational risk exchange with certain expectations about the 
employer’s benevolence. This was classic opportunistic behavior 
by employers in the face of rising profit pressures. In response, 
employees began pursuing civil tort actions. Initially, these suits 
were met with jurists importing classical contract ideas—built upon 
a model of purely competitive motivations—into traditional 
master-servant law. The fellow servant rule, applied in Farwell v. 
Boston & Worcester R.R., is the most notable example.136 At this 
point, the employment exchange began to be characterized as just 
another contract.137 
The struggle to establish a new external norm of legal 
responsibility (rather than just moral responsibility) for  
workplace injuries played out in the judicial creation of several  
ad hoc exceptions to the fellow servant rule, including the “safe 
tools, safe worksite, competent servant, constructive knowledge, 
 
 132. See Tomlins, supra note 126, at 399. 
 133. See id. at 400. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id.; see also infra note 154 (discussing the first such case, Barnes v. Boston & 
Worcester R.R. Corp.). 
 136. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842). The fellow servant rule 
held that an employee injured on the job could not recover in tort against his employer if the 
injury was caused by the negligence of a co-employee or “fellow servant.” See also Lawrence 
M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. 
REV. 50, 56 (1967) (“Shaw’s opinion [in Farwell] makes extreme assumptions about behavior, 
justified only by a philosophy of economic individualism. . . . Shaw’s generation placed an 
extremely high value on economic growth.”). 
 137. See supra note 76. 
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and extraordinary risks” exceptions, as well as the “vice  
principal (or superior servant), the different department, and  
the subcontractor” exceptions.138 All of these permitted workers,  
in certain circumstances, to escape the harsh consequences of  
the Farwell fellow servant rule and recover against their  
employer. These exceptions grew out of a rediscovery of the 
employer’s old status-based duties under master-servant common 
law to provide a reasonably safe workplace and to warn employees 
of dangerous conditions.139 
The common law did not quickly settle on a stable new external 
norm for occupational risk exchanges.140 Exceptions to the fellow 
servant rule were applied unevenly and inconsistently.141 The 
increasing number of tort suits and the unruly exceptions led some 
jurists to advocate for workers’ compensation legislation.142 
Eventually, in the prevailing historical account, workers and 
employers alike were sufficiently frustrated with the 
 
 138. PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD 5, 120–24 (1997) (citing exceptions to the 
fellow servant rule as examples of innovative instrumentalist jurisprudence “finding ways 
around an obnoxious rule or, indeed, of . . . changing it in order for those victims to emerge 
victorious”). See also Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 136, at 59–62 (1967) (arguing that, by 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, judges began to reject Farwell’s reasoning and began 
developing “scores” of doctrinal exceptions to the rule). 
 139. See, e.g., Cleveland, C. & C.R. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201, 209–10 (Ohio 1854) 
(“When one enters his employment in a subordinate situation, and agrees to be subject to his 
orders, either directly or indirectly given, he has a right to expect that his employer will 
perform the duty resting upon him, to furnish suitable machinery, and control it with care 
and prudence.”); see also RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); 
Bodie, supra note 52, at 838 (describing the common law roots of these duties). 
 140. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 136, at 65 (“The common law doctrines were 
designed to preserve a certain economic balance in the community. When the courts and 
legislatures created numerous exceptions, the rules lost much of their efficiency as a 
limitation on the liability of businessmen.”). Friedman and Ladinsky’s reference to a “certain 
economic balance in the community” likely reflects an unstated but understood external 
norm about the allocation of risks of injury as between an employee and an employer. In 
addition to common law exceptions, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 eliminated 
the fellow servant rule for railroads. See 35 Stat. 65 (1908); Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 
136, at 64–65. State legislation was also making inroads. John Fabian Witt reports that “[b]y 
1911 twenty-five states had enacted legislation variously abolishing the fellow servant rule, 
modifying the contributory negligence doctrine, and limiting the assumption of risk rule.” 
JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 67 (2004). 
 141. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 136, at 65 (“The rules prevented many plaintiffs 
from recovering, but not all; a few plaintiffs recovered large verdicts. There were costs of 
settlements, costs of liability insurance, costs of administration, legal fees and the salaries of 
staff lawyers. . . . It was desirable to be able to predict costs and insure against fluctuating, 
unpredictable risks.”). 
 142. Id. at 67–68. 
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unpredictability of litigation that support grew on both sides for 
no-fault workers’ compensation systems, which are now nearly 
universal.143 Social norms had come a long way from the mere 
moral employer obligation that Lord Mansfield recognized, and the 
“Grand Bargain” of workers’ compensation grew out of the 
resulting instability. 
External norms imposed by sovereign law continued to evolve, 
beginning with protections for children, industry-specific laws, and 
state laws that regulated some workplaces.144 In 1970, the federal 
Act was signed into law.145 The Act’s general duty clause, by its 
terms, was both broader and narrower than the analogous common 
law master-servant duty.146 Broader, because the Act is not 
governed by the common law’s negligence (reasonableness) 
 
 143. See id. at 68–69 (“When considerations of politics were added to those of business 
economics and industrial peace, it was not surprising to find that businessmen gradually 
withdrew their veto against workmen’s compensation statutes. They began to say that a 
reformed system was inevitable—and even desirable.”). See also WITT, supra note 140, at 4 
(“By the beginning of 1920, compensation systems . . . were in place in forty-two states and 
three U.S. territories, replacing a wide swath of nineteenth-century common law with 
compulsory state-administered insurance regimes.”). While some type of reform in response 
to the “industrial accident crisis” might have been inevitable by the early 1900s, Witt argues 
that the particular reform adopted in nearly all U.S. jurisdictions was by no means inevitable; 
indeed, it was “accidental.” See id. at 20–21 (“[W]e experimented with a wide array of 
plausible alternatives in remaking American law for the modern world, each of which 
represented different paths that American lawmakers might have taken into the twentieth 
century. In turn, the paths ultimately taken were the contingent outcomes of encounters 
between these alternatives and the cultures, institutions, and individual men and women of 
American law.”). 
 144. See generally Marjorie E. Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Much Ado 
About Something, 3 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 248 nn.4–5 (1972) (describing the history of 
occupational safety laws leading up to passage of the Act). 
 145. See generally Nina G. Stillman & John R. Wheeler, The Expansion of Occupational 
Safety and Health Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 969 (1987) (providing a historical account of 
the development of OSHA, workers’ compensation, and other components of workplace 
safety law). 
 146. See Richard S. Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of 
Torts, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 612, 616 (1974) (“At common law the employer was obliged 
only to exercise ordinary care to make his workplace safe for his employees.”). Some 
evidence in the legislative history suggests that lawmakers may have thought the general 
duty clause was coextensive with common law duties. See id. at 621–23 nn.63–65 (citing both 
Senate and House reports suggesting that the general duty clause imposes common law 
duties). See generally Richard S. Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REV. 988, 1003 (1973) (noting the OSHRC’s rejection of the 
common law unholy trinity defenses when considering the general duty clause). 
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standard.147 The Act requires a workplace “free from [certain] 
recognized hazards.”148 Narrower, because the Act does not 
regulate unrecognized hazards, nor hazards imposing risks of  
only minor injuries. Only recognized hazards “likely to cause death 
or serious physical harm” trigger violations of the Act’s general 
duty clause.149 
4. Context-specific internal norms and opportunism 
Employers generate internal norms about job security through 
corporate policies, credos, culture, and handbooks.150 These 
internal norms have been effective, resulting in a widespread 
erroneous perception by many employees that they are protected 
by something other than the at-will employment rule.151 
Similar internal norms are likely at play in worker safety. 
Corporate credos, codes, and culture often emphasize the primary 
importance of safety. As just one example, ExxonMobil’s CEO 
stated, in 2015, that safety “must be more than a priority, it must be 
a value—a core value that shapes decision-making all the time, at 
every level.”152 An emphasis on safety in company rules, standards, 
and procedures is “not enough;” instead, the “answer is ultimately 
found in a company’s culture—the unwritten standards and norms 
that shape mindsets, attitudes, and behaviors.”153 Messages like 
these can shape the parties’ understandings of their respective 
rights and obligations in the exchange. 
But formal corporate policies can be used opportunistically by 
employers to override unwritten, prevailing internal norms and 
customs after an accident occurs. Tomlins provides an early, vivid 
example of just this sort of opportunistic employer behavior in a 
nineteenth century railroad case, Barnes v. Boston & Worcester R.R. 
 
 147. See Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that the statutory duty, unlike the common 
law, “was not characterized in terms of reasonableness”); Miller, supra note 146, at 616. 
 148. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Bird, supra note 15, at 165–85. 
 151. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1997–98). 
 152. Darren W. Woods, Chairman and CEO, Exxon Mobile, Building a Culture of Safety 
(Apr. 9, 2015) (transcript available at http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/ 
news-and-updates/speeches/building-a-culture-of-safety). 
 153. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Corp.154 Barnes was hired to perform maintenance work on bridges 
and was injured, leading to the loss of his arm, in an accident that 
occurred while he was riding the “gravel train” (which apparently 
had cracked wheels) to accompany work materials to the bridge 
where he planned to “jump off and join his workmen.”155 In the 
resulting litigation, the railroad took the position that an implied 
aspect of the employment contract was that no workers were 
“allowed to use the gravel train other than the gang of laborers 
specifically assigned to it.”156 Workers were to use the first car of 
the passenger train, and “if Barnes had chosen to ride on the gravel 
train he had done so at his own risk.”157 Despite the stated company 
policy, Barnes presented witnesses who testified that they also rode 
the gravel train under circumstances similar to those facing Barnes, 
apparently with the consent of the railroad.158 The arguments in 
Barnes illustrate that the parties’ understanding of the occupational 
risk exchange ought to consider not only formal pronouncements 
and policies about the risk exchange, but also the actual day-to-day 
practice and customs of the parties. 
Internal norms will, by definition, vary on a case-by-case basis, 
but a relational view of the occupational risk exchange counsels to 
carefully consider how these internal norms shape the parties’ 
expectations. Internal norms help shape the parties’ 
understandings of their individual rights and obligations in the 
exchange and can reduce the transaction costs that would 
otherwise accompany formal contracting between an employer and 
employee on every possible anticipated factual scenario. Internal 
norms will often reflect the influence of cooperative motivations 
underlying the occupational risk exchange. 
 
 154. Barnes is an unreported case from the Suffolk County Court of Common Pleas, 
October Term 1837. See Tomlins, supra note 126, at 376–77 & n.4; see also John Fabian Witt, 
The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467, 
1479 n.66 (1998). Tomlins notes that Barnes was the “first in a flood of suits alleging that 
employers were legally obliged to compensate employees for injuries arising in the course 
of their employment that came before American courts in the quarter century prior to the 
Civil War.” Tomlins, supra note 126, at 377. 
 155. See Tomlins, supra note 126, at 376. 
 156. Id. at 401. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. Tomlins describes the testimony as showing that the railroad’s “‘rule’ was less 
than prescriptive in practice.” Id. 
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C. Anti-Opportunism Corollaries for Workplace Law 
What does anti-opportunism look like in practice for workplace 
safety regulation? What are its core prescriptions? This subpart 
addresses these questions by developing a short list of corollaries 
flowing from the fundamental anti-opportunism principle that 
employment regulations ought to be used to defeat opportunistic 
behavior by employers or employees. 
A relational account of worker safety recognizes that, in 
employment relationships, the parties’ significant cooperative 
motivations suggest a baseline level of trust that requires both 
parties to act in good faith regarding risks. One of the commonly-
suggested normative prescriptions growing out of relational 
contract theory is imposing a meaningful duty of good faith in 
contracts falling toward the relational end of the spectrum.159 A 
meaningful duty of good faith makes an obvious starting point  
for anti-opportunism in workplace safety, but it does not go  
far enough. 
Professor Bodie has argued that employment relationships are 
and should be imbued with more than simply a contractual good 
faith duty; rather, he recommends something more like a fiduciary 
duty.160 Whether owing to Professor Macneil’s relational contract 
theory or to the quasi-fiduciary duties that Professor Bodie 
identifies as flowing from the structure of modern firms, a basic set 
of anti-opportunism corollaries governing workplace safety can be 
articulated, as follows: 
 
Anti-Opportunism Corollaries for Worker Safety Law: 
 
A. Employers and employees owe obligations not to 
engage in opportunistic behavior that deprives the other 
of the benefit of the occupational risk exchange, taking 
 
 159. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 854 
(2017) (“Both employees and the employer have a set of mutual interests that differentiate 
employment from other contractual relationships. And the employment relationship gives 
both employees and the employer discretion over aspects of the relationship that allow for 
opportunism. The employer—as legal entity, and as aggregate of the individuals who 
comprise the employer—has relational responsibilities similar to fiduciary duties. Therefore, 
it makes sense to characterize the employment relationship as a whole as fiduciary, and the 
employer as a fiduciary of its employees.”). 
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into account both the external and internal norms 
guiding that exchange. 
B. An employer owes a fiduciary obligation to reasonably 
investigate and understand the safety and health risks 
presented by the working conditions of its employees. 
C. An employer owes a fiduciary obligation to disclose all 
relevant information about these safety and health risks 
to employees and prospective employees, including an 
obligation to warn of any specific, nonobvious or 
complex risks. 
D. Employees owe a fiduciary obligation to reasonably 
inform the employer of any safety and health  
risks which may not be known or understood by  
the employer. 
E. An employer owes a fiduciary obligation to not subject 
their employees to unnecessarily dangerous working 
conditions that most reasonable employees would reject 
in light of their terms of employment. 
F. Employees owe a fiduciary obligation to take care in the 
performance of their duties. 
 
This set of substantive anti-opportunism obligations extends 
beyond the formal contractual obligations in typical employment 
exchanges. And the obligations are fundamentally contrary to the 
presumption underlying the strong version of Farwell’s fellow 
servant rule and the economic account—that a worker is presumed 
to understand and accept all risks of the work and that wages are 
presumed to have been adjusted accordingly. But the formulation 
tracks the parties’ cooperative motivations and accepts the 
influence of external and internal norms. 
Despite being extra-contractual, this formulation is largely 
reflected in existing worker safety law. The Act’s general duty 
clause obligates employers to provide “employment and a place of 
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are 
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his 
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employees.”161 Nothing in the reasoning of Farwell would require 
that a workplace be free from such recognized hazards; nor can the 
general duty clause be attributed entirely to the existence of any 
identified market failure. The general duty clause is the legal 
manifestation of prevailing social (external) norms surrounding the 
employment relationship.162 
This formulation is also consistent with OSHA’s Hazard 
Communication standard, which obligates an employer to disclose 
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) to employees to explain 
existing scientific knowledge on the risks posed by exposure to 
potentially hazardous substances in the workplace.163 The 
relational account would go further, however, by imposing an 
affirmative good faith duty on employers to investigate potential 
hazards presented in their workplaces. Skeptics of the Hazard 
Communication standard worry that it leaves employers (and 
chemical manufacturers and suppliers) free to use and market 
potentially hazardous substances without imposing any 
affirmative duty to research the substances, and also allows 
employers to withhold information about the chemical makeup of 
substances under an assertion of trade secret protection.164 A 
 
 161. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012). The Act’s general duty clause is both broader and 
narrower than the common law duty. Broader, because the clause requires employers to 
ensure that their workplaces are “free” from all “recognized hazards” if the hazards threaten 
serious injury or death; in contrast, the common law required only that employers exercise 
ordinary care (i.e., a negligence standard) in providing safe workplaces. See Miller, supra note 
146, at 616. Narrower, because the clause imposes no obligation to eliminate unrecognized 
hazards (regardless of the potential harm or the unreasonableness of failing to eliminate such 
hazards) and no obligation to remove hazards that are likely to cause harm falling short of 
serious physical harm or death. See id. at 617. The Restatement of Employment Law adopts 
a negligence standard, setting out a duty “to provide a reasonably safe workplace, including 
reasonably safe equipment . . . .” RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 4.05 (AM. LAW. INST. 
2015). 
 162. Congress recognized that it would be impossible to speak with specificity to every 
possible workplace hazard in a manner that would be universally applicable to employers, 
given the infinite possible conditions of various workplaces. See infra note 171 and 
accompanying text. 
 163. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (2012). 
 164. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to 
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1702 n.285 (2004); 
Susan D. Carle, Note, A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and Incentives to Suppress Under 
OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard, 97 YALE L.J. 581, 585 (1988). The absence of any 
affirmative duty to investigate has made it difficult for OSHA to promulgate specific 
standards identifying permissible exposure limits for individual substances. This led former 
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relational account, built on recognition of cooperative  
motivations, suggests that the Hazard Communication standard 
should be strengthened. 
Anti-opportunism ought to be recognized as a proper purpose 
of the Act, whether that recognition is based on relational contract 
theory or on an express recognition of quasi-fiduciary duties 
inherent in the special relationship of employment. The corollaries 
that flow from that recognition can help guide the further 
development of workplace safety regulation, including the 
resolution of disputes about the boundaries of occupational  
safety regulation.165 
V. ANTI-OPPORTUNISM AS A LIMITING PRINCIPLE:  
RESOLVING THE SEAWORLD DILEMMA 
Return to Judge Kavanaugh’s two questions in SeaWorld.166 
When should we paternalistically decide that willing participants 
in sports or entertainment activities must be protected from 
themselves? And who decides whether the risk to participants is 
too high? This Part provides answers to both questions, showing 
that the anti-opportunism purpose of OSHA can function as a 
limiting principle. Taking Judge Kavanaugh’s question about who 
decides first, this Part contends that OSHA (in its enforcement role) 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
(OSHRC) (in its adjudicatory role) are well-positioned to police 
relational opportunism in cases like SeaWorld because they have the 
technical expertise to carefully evaluate the factual context of 
individual employment relationships. Next, this Part examines the 
enforcement and fact-finding in SeaWorld, with an eye toward facts 
in the record demonstrating relational opportunism. This Part then 
 
OSHA Director David Michael to solicit the public for ideas about creative ways to address 
OSHA’s recognized inability to effectively promulgate and update PELs. See also David 
Michaels, Assistant Sec’y of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Request 
for Information on Updating OSHA’s Chemical Permissible Exposure Limits (Oct. 9, 2014) 
(transcript available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document? 
p_table=SPEECHES&p_id=3313). 
 165. The anti-opportunism principle and relational contract theory may also have 
important implications for resolving employee classification questions, considering the 
propriety of deregulatory reforms, and questioning the wisdom of workers’ compensation 
opt-out alternatives and other workers’ compensation reforms. 
 166. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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compares the findings of fact in SeaWorld to the NFL and NASCAR 
hypotheticals, identifying potential distinctions. Finally, this Part 
urges the creation of an affirmative defense that can help cabin 
application of the general duty clause in inherently dangerous 
occupations to only those cases involving relational opportunism. 
A. OSHA’s Enforcement Structure 
Judge Kavanaugh suggests that Congress, state legislators or 
regulators, or federal or state courts applying tort law are more 
appropriate entities to make determinations about restricting 
inherently dangerous jobs.167 Congress, however, determined that 
workplace safety concerns merited a federal response168 and that 
OSHA and OSHRC should be delegated enforcement and 
adjudicatory authority, respectively.169 The choice was an 
appropriate and defensible one. 
The Act’s general duty clause is strikingly broad, but it has 
nonetheless withstood constitutional challenges based on its 
vagueness.170 Congress included the general duty clause in the Act 
based on its recognition that it would be impossible to develop 
specific standards for every possible employment hazard.171 
Congress presumably recognized that employment relationships 
and their accompanying safety risks are too diverse to capture fully 
in a comprehensive schedule of standards.   
 
 167. See supra note 11. 
 168. See Gross, supra note 144, at 249 (“Private industry and state regulation were not 
doing an adequate job of insuring health and safety in the workplace.”). 
 169. See id. at 250–51. 
 170. Constitutional challenges to the Act’s general duty clause on the basis of 
vagueness have been rejected by multiple federal courts of appeals. See Ensign-Bickford Co. 
v. OSHRC, 717 F.2d 1419, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Bethlehem Steel v. OSHRC, 607 F.2d 871, 875 
(3d Cir. 1979); Georgia Elec. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 322, n.32 (5th Cir. 1979); see also 
Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that any problems 
of fair notice under the general duty clause “dissipate when we read the clause as applying 
when a reasonably prudent employer in the industry would have known that the proposed 
method of abatement was required under the job conditions where the citation was issued.”). 
 171. See S. Rep. 91-1282 (Oct. 6, 1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186; 
Gross, supra note 144, at 253–54 (“The general duty clause is not a general substitute for 
reliance on standards, but simply enables the Secretary of Labor to insure the protection of 
employees who are working under special circumstances for which no standard has yet  
been adopted.”). 
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After considerable debate about the Secretary of Labor’s role, 
Congress ultimately decided on a split-enforcement model.172 It 
assigned only the prosecutorial function (including investigation, 
issuance of citations, and assessing penalties) to the Secretary of 
Labor, which exercises this authority through its designee, 
OSHA.173 The authority to adjudicate citations is assigned to a 
separate agency, OSHRC, which acts as an impartial arbiter when 
employers challenge OSHA citations.174 
OSHA enforces the general duty clause through case-by-case 
adjudication.175 Due to the residual nature of the general duty 
clause, any determination by OSHA to execute its prosecutorial 
function by citing employers for its violation will require highly 
fact-specific judgments by OSHA. But this appears to have been 
fully understood by Congress.176 And it is a defensible choice. As 
Jay Feinman notes, a relational approach to interpreting parties’ 
obligations is “contextual with a vengeance.”177 He writes that such 
a relational analysis requires “immersing itself in the facts of the 
 
 172. See Gross, supra note 144, at 250–51; George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-
Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 
315, 315 (1987) (“[The Act] adopted a relatively novel and seldom-used feature in federal 
administrative practice—the split-enforcement model for agency adjudications.”). 
 173. See 29 U.S.C. 658-59, 666 (2012); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 147, 151 (1991) (“If 
the Secretary (or the Secretary’s designate) determines upon investigation that an employer 
is failing to comply with such a standard, the Secretary is authorized to issue a citation and 
to assess the employer a monetary penalty.”); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 
88 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 174. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 7 (1985). Although a 
neutral arbiter, the OSHRC owes a duty to actively and affirmatively protect the public. See 
Brennan v. OSHRC, 492 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation 
Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965)) (comparing the OSHRC to the Federal Power 
Commission and noting that its role “as representative of the public interest ‘does not permit 
it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the 
right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the 
Commission.’”). 
 175. See Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 176. Congressman William Hathaway drew a comparison between OSHA enforcing 
the general duty clause and the police making initial determinations about criminal 
violations:  
[It has been said that] it would be up to an inspector to decide what the general 
duty was. I suppose that is true; it is up to the policeman to decide in the first 
instance whether or not we have broken a law, too, but we do have resort to the 
courts . . . . And hopefully, after a while, a body of law could be formulated so that 
later cases would have precedents behind them . . . .  
116 Cong. Rec. 10631 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1970) (statement of Rep. William Hathaway); see 
Gross, supra note 144, at 267–68. 
 177. See Feinman, supra note 57, at 742. 
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particular contract and of the contexts from which it arises.”178 For 
such a specialized, highly-contextual, fact-specific analysis, 
administrative enforcement and adjudication in a specialized 
quasi-judicial forum makes sense.179 
Despite Judge Kavanaugh’s misgivings, Congress delegated to 
OSHA the enforcement function and to OSHRC the adjudicative 
function for fact-finding and determinations of general duty clause 
violations. This reflects a Congressional judgment to vest these 
powers, subject to judicial review, with OSHA and OSHRC, in 
recognition of their expertise in dealing with the infinite variety of 
employment relationships and threats to workplace safety. In the 
Act, Congress defensibly answered the question of who decides that 
the risks to employees are too high—OSHA and OSHRC. 
B. Relational Opportunism in SeaWorld 
Evidence of extra-contractual internal norms and indications of 
opportunism permeate the factual record in SeaWorld. OSHA’s 
issuance of the general duty citation and proposed abatement, 
along with OSHA’s defense of its actions in litigation before 
OSHRC and the D.C. Circuit, reveal that OSHA was acting as an 
effective check on the employer’s opportunistic behavior. The 
record reveals that SeaWorld was acting opportunistically by 
exposing trainers to preventable but known and unpredictable 
risks, while minimizing and mischaracterizing those risks to the 
trainers. The record also supports the conclusion that SeaWorld 
was shifting to trainers the responsibility to ensure that the 
workplace was adequately safe. To view the employment 
relationship in its full context requires careful attention to the 
factual record. 
SeaWorld relied on its trainers to engage in what SeaWorld 
termed “operant conditioning” of the orcas and to recognize signs 
of any abnormal behavior.180 Operant conditioning involved 
 
 178. See id. 
 179. See generally Gross, supra note 144, at 260 (“In fact, next to the Tax Court of the 
United States and the United States Court of Military Appeals, [the OSHRC] is the closest 
approximation to a court existing in the executive branch.”). 
 180. See Final Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor at 30–31, SeaWorld of Florida, 
LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1375). The D.C. Circuit majority noted 
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trainers offering the whale positive reinforcement for desirable 
behavior, ignoring (offering no reward for) undesirable behavior, 
and recognizing any “precursors” or cues that the whale may not 
be behaving as expected.181 SeaWorld then kept incident reports on 
abnormal behavior exhibited by the orcas, though a SeaWorld 
witness admitted that SeaWorld failed to document “a few” 
incidents.182 SeaWorld and other marine parks having a 
relationship with SeaWorld had experienced three prior human 
deaths in connection with orca whales, as well as several physical 
injuries and close calls.183 SeaWorld’s management relied primarily 
on information provided by the employees themselves to 
determine whether conditions were safe.184 
The record contained significant evidence of internal norms 
specific to trainers’ employment relationship that likely influenced 
trainers’ relational expectations. Trainers were required to sign a 
waiver-like document acknowledging the “inherent risks” in the 
job and indicating that they agreed to tell a supervisor if they 
became uncomfortable with taking “the calculated risks.”185 
But SeaWorld characterized these risks as both controllable and 
predictable, through corporate documents and culture. One of the 
trainers’ manuals provided: “While the potential for serious 
physical injuries exists, if trainers maintain top physical condition, 
and adhere to safety and departmental procedures, the potential for 
injury is dramatically reduced.”186 This was driven home by a 
culture that cultivated a false “mythology among the trainers that 
they have a deep understanding of the whales.”187 SeaWorld’s 
training and discussion of orca behavior, including likening it to the 
ability to read or predict the behavior of horses or dogs, may  
 
that SeaWorld’s “operant conditioning” measures and safety protocols did not make the 
orcas “safe,” but rather “demonstrate[d] SeaWorld’s recognition that the killer whales 
interacting with trainers are dangerous and unpredictable.” SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. 
Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1209 (2014). 
 181. SeaWorld of Florida, 2012 WL 3019734, at *4. 
 182. Id. at *18. 
 183. Id. at *14–15, *17–18. One of these three prior deaths was not a trainer, but an 
individual who stayed in the park after hours and entered Tilikum’s pool. It is not known 
whether Tilikum played a role in his death. Id. 
 184. Final Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, supra note 180, at 30–31. 
 185. SeaWorld of Florida, 2012 WL 3019734, at *16. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Final Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, supra note 180, at 18. 
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have led trainers to misunderstand the real, inevitable, and 
ultimately non-controllable and unpredictable risks posed by orcas 
in captivity.188 
The ALJ cited an example that highlights the true relational 
expectations of the parties. On incident report forms, one standard 
question was whether the acts of the employee (trainer) contributed 
to the accident. A trainer comment circulated in response to an 
incident suggested that this form question was unnecessary, 
because the answer was always yes: 
Since we condition all aspects of the behavior and the behavior 
broke down then we do contribute to the incident. I also seem to 
remember that we discussed this and said that since the answer is 
always yes that we would drop this from future incident reports 
and just assume it as such.189 
As the ALJ observed, this revealed the culture that SeaWorld 
cultivated: “All behavior is thus predictable. . . . [I]njuries sustained 
by a trainer will always be traceable to human error. It is not the 
operant conditioning program that is inadequate; it is the 
performance of the trainer that is flawed.”190 
SeaWorld’s stated policies also conflicted with the reality of the 
employment relationship in a way that parallels Barnes, discussed 
above. In Barnes, employees often rode the gravel train with the 
consent of the railroad, in an effort to save time and be more 
productive—seemingly demonstrating a cooperative motivation. 
Only after Barnes’ injury did the railroad opportunistically claim 
that he should have waited for a passenger car, and that by riding 
the gravel train he did so at his own risk. Likewise, the ALJ found 
that SeaWorld had an “expectation that [trainers] will continue 
with the show performance regardless of the precursors 
demonstrated by the killer whales.”191 The ALJ continued, 
“Although SeaWorld’s official stance is that trainers have the 
option to end a show if they feel uncomfortable with the situation, 
the reality is SeaWorld discourages such action.”192 SeaWorld 
engaged in “a form of Monday morning quarterbacking,” by 
 
 188. See id. 
 189. SeaWorld of Florida, 2012 WL 3019734, at *25. 
 190. Id. at *26. 
 191. Id. at *27. 
 192. Id. at **27–28 (citing critiques of trainers who cut performances short). 
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“second-guessing” their actions and invariably identifying a trainer 
error that contributed to the incident.193 
In its investigation and prosecution of the general duty clause 
violation, OSHA was in a position to get a complete picture of the 
SeaWorld trainers’ relationship with their employer, in the context 
of all the external and internal norms that shaped that relationship. 
OSHA pinpointed opportunistic behavior, and the OSHRC ALJ, 
acting as neutral arbiter of the citation, cited evidence of that 
opportunistic behavior in affirming the citation. SeaWorld did not 
live up to the relational expectations of its trainers, and OSHA was 
well-positioned to recognize that. Far from acting as if it had quasi-
fiduciary duties to its employees, SeaWorld appears to have 
intentionally and opportunistically instilled a culture that 
misleadingly suggested that operant conditioning rendered the 
workplace safe, despite formalistic disclaimers. If OSHA regulation 
can be justified by an anti-opportunism purpose, then the citation 
and proposed abatement in SeaWorld were appropriate. 
C. NASCAR and the NFL 
Judge Kavanaugh saw no principled distinction between the 
proposed abatement in SeaWorld and banning tackling in the NFL 
or setting speed limits in NASCAR races. But by examining the 
available evidence of internal norms in the relevant employment 
relationships, distinctions from SeaWorld emerge. This subpart 
considers those distinctions. 
NASCAR is the easier case.194 Over the years since the first 
“Strictly Stock” race in 1949, NASCAR has introduced a number of 
features designed to make stock car racing safer.195 These include, 
inter alia, six-point restraint systems, body panel specifications, 
frame enhancements, roll cages, roof flaps, and impact-absorbing 
 
 193. Id. at *28. 
 194. Set aside for purposes of this discussion the question whether NASCAR drivers 
are employees or independent contractors. NASCAR maintains that its drivers are 
independent contractors. See Steven Cole Smith, How the NFL’s Hidden Scourge Threatens 
NASCAR Drivers, ROAD & TRACK (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.roadandtrack.com/car-
culture/a6253/slipping-away-65-6-roa0214/. 
 195. See generally Mark Aumann, Safety Improvements, Changes Define Racing Eras, 
NASCAR.COM (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/ 
2011/02/16/nascar-safety-history.html. 
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track walls.196 But there does not appear to be publicly available 
concrete allegations or evidence that NASCAR acted 
opportunistically—contrary to the relational expectations of the 
drivers. For example, my research uncovered no evidence that 
NASCAR has been accused of hiding evidence of risks of injury or 
death from high-speed collisions. Although chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy (CTE) is now on NASCAR’s (and drivers’) radar,197 
I have uncovered no concrete allegation (unlike in SeaWorld or in 
litigation against the NFL) that NASCAR unreasonably 
mischaracterized or failed to investigate or disclose evidence of any 
connection between racing crashes and the development of CTE. 
If NASCAR had indeed acted contrary to the relational 
expectations of the parties—including by breaching a fiduciary 
obligation to reasonably investigate and disclose any risks of stock 
car racing—then an OSHA general duty clause citation and 
abatement might well have been appropriate.198 But without any 
such indication, Judge Kavanaugh’s comparison of NASCAR 
drivers to the position of SeaWorld’s orca trainers, as revealed by 
the factual record in the OSHRC proceedings, is unconvincing. 
The NFL hypothetical advanced by Judge Kavanaugh is more 
complex. For NFL players, there appears to be an important 
distinction between current and former players. Several former 
players have specifically alleged in litigation that the league was 
aware of research on the long-term effects of repeated head trauma 
caused by tackling on the brain, yet intentionally concealed that 
 
 196. See NASCAR Safety Improvements, FOX SPORTS (Oct. 20, 2016, 4:52 PM), 
https://www.foxsports.com/nascar/gallery/nascar-safety-improvements-060614. 
 197. See Smith, supra note 194; see also Concussions in NASCAR Gain Drivers’ Attention, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/sports/nascar-
acknowledges-risk-and-dangers-of-drivers-concussions.html; Ken Willis, NASCAR and 
Concussions: An Old Problem, a New Concern, GATEHOUSE MEDIA, http://gatehousenews. 
com/nascarconcussion/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2019). 
 198. See supra Part IV.C. (discussing the anti-opportunism corollaries B. and C.); see also 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, Maxwell v. NFL, No. 
BC465842, (Cal. Super. July 19, 2011), 2011 WL 2834814. Again, for purposes of this 
discussion I will assume that NASCAR drivers are protected by OSHA. See supra note 194. 
Another hurdle for an OSHA citation of NASCAR is that any ordered abatement must be 
feasible, and speed limits may fail this test if they would fundamentally alter the nature  
of the product. A similar argument was made and rejected in SeaWorld. 748 F.3d 1202,  
1215 (2014). 
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information from players.199 A class of retired NFL players sued the 
league, and a settlement fund, including payouts of up to $5 million 
per participating class member, has been approved.200 In the case of 
those former players, the NFL may well have been operating in 
violation of the general duty clause, interpreted as an instrument of 
anti-opportunism. 
But for current NFL players who joined the league after 
widespread reports about CTE concerns, the situation is different. 
Their relational exchanges look different, because the internal and 
external norms have changed, as well as the NFL’s behavior. The 
NFL has pledged to fund further scientific research into CTE and 
the potential connection to head trauma resulting from tackle 
football.201 The NFL has also instituted a number of rule  
changes designed to reduce the risk.202 These steps alone might  
not be enough to show that the NFL has not acted opportunistically 
with regard to current players; but the contextual facts shaping 
current players’ relational expectations certainly differ  
significantly from those that faced retired players.203 On the 
evidence now publicly available, current players appear to have a 
weaker case (with respect to them) that the NFL engaged in 
opportunistic, self-interested behavior that ran contrary to their 
relational expectations.204 
 
 199. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-
02323-AB, 2019 WL 95917 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2019). Similar concussion litigation has been filed 
by former National Hockey League (NHL) players. See In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., MDL No. 14–2551, 2017 WL 3141921 (D. Minn. July 24, 2017). 
 200. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2019 WL 95917. A 
final class settlement was approved by the district court, as amended, on May 11, 2015, and 
became effective following appeals on January 7, 2017. The settlement includes payment for 
medical monitoring and monetary awards for certain diagnoses, including CTE, Alzheimer’s 
Disease, ALS, Parkinson’s Disease, and dementia. See NFL CONCUSSION SETTLEMENT, 
www.nflconcussionsettlement.com (last visited February 25, 2018).  
 201. NFL Issues Response to CTE Research Report, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/news 
/story/0ap3000000822159/article/nfl-issues-response-to-cte-research-report (last updated 
July 26, 12:02 PM). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Bill Bradley, Richard Sherman: NFL Players Are Aware of Risks of Playing Football, 
NFL, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000268627/article/richard-sherman-nfl-
players-are-aware-of-risks-of-playing-football (last updated Oct. 24, 2013, 12:24 PM) (“The 
players before us took that risk too, but they still sued the league because they felt like they 
were lied to about the long-term risks. Today, we’re fully educating guys on the risks and 
we’re still playing. We have not hidden from the facts.”). 
 204. See id. 
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D. A Proposed Affirmative Defense 
Applying relational insights to the SeaWorld case and the NFL 
and NASCAR hypotheticals suggests the creation of a doctrinal 
affirmative defense to an OSHA general duty clause citation. The 
affirmative defense would be based on the anti-opportunism 
corollaries identified above205 and would be designed to cabin 
OSHA citations to only those cases involving employers who act 
contrary to the relational expectations of the parties to the 
employment exchange. An employer in an industry that involves 
inherent danger could successfully defend against an OSHA 
general duty clause citation and abatement order by demonstrating 
both of the following two elements: 
 
(1) the occupation involves necessary health or safety risks, 
the elimination of which is not possible without 
changing the essence of the business; and 
(2) the employer has met its fiduciary obligations to (a) 
reasonably investigate the health and safety risks posed 
by the occupation, and (b) disclose all relevant 
information about the health and safety risks to 
employees and prospective employees, including 
warning of any specific, nonobvious or complex risks. 
 
This affirmative defense would provide a safe harbor for certain 
professional sports, entertainment, law enforcement, emergency 
response, and other occupations in which some level of risk is 
inherent and unavoidable. It would also permit context-specific 
analysis of the unique risks posed in a variety of employment 
exchanges, potentially including NASCAR, the NFL, and other 
contact professional sports. Yet, a finding that an occupation 
contains some level of inherent risk would not alone be sufficient 
to avoid citation. Rather, the employer must affirmatively 
demonstrate that it has not acted opportunistically with respect to 
those risks. This required showing could provide the distinction 
that Judge Kavanaugh seeks between the factual record in SeaWorld 
(and perhaps former NFL players) and the situation for current 
NASCAR drivers and NFL players. The narrowly limited nature of 
 
 205. See supra Part IV.C. (specifically, Corollaries A.–C.). 
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this affirmative defense would serve the Act’s purposes by 
protecting employees from precisely the sort of opportunistic 
behavior by employers that was found by the ALJ in SeaWorld.206 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The search continues for the overarching purpose(s) of 
employment law, as a field distinct from contract and tort law. 
Employment contracts are not discrete bargains, and utility 
maximization is not the sole motivation for the parties. Cooperative 
motivations also drive the exchange and must be considered when 
identifying the justifications for employment regulation. Relational 
contract theory suggests that anti-opportunism is an important 
justification for market interventions that regulate the employment 
relationship. This anti-opportunism purpose has been 
underappreciated in the employment law scholarship generally, 
and has not been given sustained consideration in the specific 
context of worker safety regulation under the Act. 
In this Article, I have attempted to show that the anti-
opportunism principle can answer both of Judge Kavanaugh’s 
questions. If anti-opportunism is a proper purpose of the Act, then 
it can justify workplace safety regulations in a broader set of cases 
than previously recognized, but also serve as a limiting principle to 
guide enforcement of the Act’s admittedly broad general duty 
clause. The anti-opportunism principle has the potential to answer 
fundamental questions about the appropriateness of market 
interventions in inherently dangerous jobs. And the anti-
opportunism principle can also explain Congress’ decision to 
delegate enforcement and adjudicatory authority over such 
difficult questions to OSHA and OSHRC, respectively. 
Relational contract theory and the principle of anti-
opportunism hold promise for bringing a degree of order to the 
mishmash of employment law. The implications likely extend 
beyond worker safety regulation to questions of employee 
classification, the possibility of reciprocal fiduciary (or quasi-
fiduciary) duties of loyalty, employee privacy rights, workers’ 
compensation reforms, and the wide variety of common law and 
 
 206. See supra Section V.B. 
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statutory limitations on the employment at-will rule. Such 
questions are ripe for further scholarly exploration. 
  
001.BENT_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:49 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
420 
 
 
